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The dynamics in U.S.-Turkey relations in both 1964 and 2003 continued to be 
between a large global power and a medium regional power in the framework of a global 
threat that required regional cooperation. In both cases the priority of the global power 
was the fight against the global threat and this created expectations from the medium 
power ally in the region, who –in both cases- had its own reservations about the issue, 
considering its own national interests.  
The analysis of the 1964 Crisis shows that both U.S. and Turkey would have five 
main sources of influence over their foreign policy decisions leading to disagreement in 
1964: the dynamics in the U.S. Turkish relations as one between a global power and a 
regional partner; domestic concerns of both countries; unaligned goals of the two parties; 
the international circumstances; and the influence of signaling failures and previous 
interactions. When we analyze the 2003 Crisis in light of these findings we see that all 
the main issues seem to be consistently relevant, though their effects might have changed 
slightly.  
Overall, both cases reveal that the above-mentioned five factors determine the 
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This thesis deals with a certain aspect of Turkish American relations, which tends 
to come to surface in unexpected moments and has significant ramifications for both 
countries as well as their allies. It covers the first major crisis in the relations between  
U.S. and Turkey – the roots of which date back to the 1947 Truman Doctrine-,  with the 
intention of understanding the last crisis between U.S. and Turkey in 2003 through a 
more historical and structural analysis. The major focus of the study is to spell out the 
variables that influenced the foreign policy decisions of both countries, in order to 
uncover the underlying trouble spots in the Turkish American relations in order to 
prevent future miscalculations and disagreements. Overall, the purpose of this study is to 
identify the factors that contributed to disagreement between Turkey and United States in 
June 1964 over the Cyprus issue resulting in the so-called ‘Johnson letter;’ to identify the 
policy lessons that could have been helpful in the 2003 Iraq Crisis, when the Turkish 
Parliament voted against the stationing of U.S. troops on Turkish soil to stage a ground 
attack on Iraq; to analyze the dynamics in Turkish American relations in order to guide 
future interactions between the two countries especially in times of regional crisis; and on 
a broader level : identify policy lessons about how global powers and medium regional 
powers interact. 
Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. U.S. and Turkey have had 
strong relations for over five decades. Turkey was a very important ally in the war against 
communism. It had, and still has, the second largest army in NATO. Its strategic location 
on the border of the Soviet Union and close to the volatile Middle Eastern region, 
together with the historical legacy of armed struggle against the Russians, and the 
Turkish quest for westernization since the beginning of the century made Turkey a 
natural ally of U.S.  Though after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 there aroused 
some doubts about the value of Turkey as an ally, the emergence of Islamic terrorism as a 
global threat after 11 September 2001 marked the parallel reemergence of Turkey’s 
strategic importance as an ally of the West.  
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Yet, despite the strong motives for collaboration, and the long history of 
cooperation on a large number of issues, U.S. and Turkey do have their differences that 
sometimes create disagreement, and because they are most often unexpected, these 
disagreements tend to create disappointment on the part of one party against the other, 
and damage the relations, creating question marks about the future prospects of 
collaboration. It may often take significant time and effort to remove the influence 
created by these disagreements. The 1964 Johnson letter and the 2003 vote of the Turkish 
Parliament are two such occasions, when one of the parties adopted policy decisions 
disadvantageous to the other party. In 1964, Turkey got an unexpected response from 
U.S. to its quest to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish 
Cypriots as well as remove a security threat from the south of its mainland. The U.S. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a very stern letter to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet 
İnönü, arguing against any such move and threatening to fail to fulfill its obligations as a 
NATO member in case of a Russian reaction. In 2003, this time U.S. got an unexpected 
“no” to its request to use Turkish soil for a ground operation into Iraq. Both cases 
resulted in the deterioration of the relations, and left lasting impacts on the views of the 
two countries toward each other. In this study, the crisis of 1964 will be analyzed in order 
to shed light on the 2003 crisis.  
Since this is a historical analysis of foreign policy formation in two countries 
regarding each other, the evolution of the foreign policy decisions in both U.S. and 
Turkey in 1964, as well as 2003 needed to be analyzed. This was done in two parallel 
tracks: one was the historical documentation of the developments that took place and the 
analysis of their effects on the policies of both countries; the other was the examining of 
internal deliberations among the policy makers before reaching a decision. The first one 
was well documented in historical books, newspapers, and analytical books written by 
experts on U.S.-Turkish relations. The second track of the research required a more 
detailed investigation of the declassified documents and the books that contained this 
declassified information. The FRUS(Foreign Relations of United States) series, and 
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Claude Nicolet’s study of American policy towards Cyprus1 contained  a good amount of 
declassified information --mostly form the U.S. national archives-- that were useful in the 
analysis of the 1964 crisis, while Fikret Bila’s report of the 2003 Crisis from the Turkish 
perspective2 continues to be the best source available in terms of the declassified 
documents it contains. 
   The study has revealed that, in 1964, United States and Turkey were looking at 
the Cyprus problem from different perspectives. Both countries had domestic and 
strategic concerns that affected their policies on the issue. But the main factors affecting 
the American policy were strategic concerns arising from the Cold War, while on the 
Turkish part domestic pressures had the stronger affect on the decision makers. Other 
factors that influenced the policy decisions of both countries in 1964 and 2003 would be 
the international circumstances, the signaling mistakes of both countries, and the effects 
of earlier interactions which created different expectations in the two countries.  
The primary U.S. concerns were: to prevent a war between two NATO allies 
(Greece and Turkey); to preserve the southern flank of NATO intact; and to ‘keep the 
Soviets out’ of Cyprus and the Mediterranean. Thus, U.S. acted to prevent a Turkish 
intervention which would jeopardize all these goals. The domestic concerns of the U.S. 
government , which included the looming presidential elections in November 1964 and 
the presence of a sizable Greek-American electorate also influenced the U.S. policy 
makers. 
Turkish government, on the other hand, was under intense domestic pressure to 
stop the killing of the Turkish-Cypriots. Turkey also worried about the island falling 
under hostile domination, which would jeopardize its security in the south. Thus, despite 
İnönü’s cautious personality and the lack of readiness in the armed forces for the 
operation, strong public opinion and the pressure from the willingness of the military for 
an  operation  persuaded  İnönü  to mount a military intervention. But, aware of the risks  
                                                 
1 Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of 
Contention, (Mannheim and Mohnesee : Bibliopolis, 2001). 
2   Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Girisimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaslari (Ankara: Unit Yayincilik, 2003) 
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involved in the operation (a possible war with Greece and a possible Soviet reaction) he 
decided to inform the United States to secure its support against those potentially 
dangerous consequences.  
The Johnson letter to İnönü was a surprise for Turkey, because it not only 
prevented a military intervention of Turkey  into Cyprus, but it also brought into question 
the security guarantees that Turkey had thought it had acquired by joining NATO in 
1952. It could be understandable that U.S. would like to prevent Turkish military action, 
but the unexpectedly harsh tone of the letter, and the reference to withdraw from alliance 
responsibilities created a sense of betrayal and disappointment in Turkey towards U.S. It 
created a lasting affect on the Turkish-American relations and has not been forgotten by 
the Turkish public since. From than on, any crisis between the two countries has been 
compared to the Johnson letter to gauge the level of the crisis. 
Although the main focus of this thesis is the developments after the December 
1963 Constitutional Crisis in Cyprus and the subsequent developments until June 1964 
that led to the Johnson letter, the period before 1963 is  examined in Chapter II – in terms 
of the historical context of U.S.-Turkey relations, the Cyprus Conflict, and the U.S. 
policy over Cyprus- in order to be able to understand the historical dynamics in U.S.-
Turkish relations, the previous history of the Cyprus dispute, and the previous U.S. policy 
over Cyprus. This will provide a historical background of all the aspects of the 1964 
Crisis, and facilitate our analysis by enabling us to compare and contrast in the following 
chapter. 
In Chapter III, we analyze the Constitutional Crisis of December 1963 and the 
subsequent developments both on the island and in the international context that led to 
the Turkish threats of intervention the last of which would be prevented from actually 
taking place by the Johnson letter of June 1964. By analyzing the Cyprus crisis all along 
from its emergence in mid-1950s up to the Johnson letter in June 1964, we will be able to 
examine the American and Turkish reactions to events in a broader context under 
different international and domestic circumstances. This will provide an opportunity to 
identify the effects of different domestic and international circumstances over the 
decision makers both in Washington and Ankara.  
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The conclusion chapter of the thesis, Chapter IV, is arranged in three different 
sections: in the first section, the factors that are identified as effecting the foreign policy 
decisions both in U.S. and Turkey leading to disagreement in June 1964 are identified 
and explained clearly. In the second section, the key events of the 2003 crisis starting 
from the first requests of U.S. from Turkey up until the March 2003 vote of the Turkish 
parliament are recounted briefly, underlining the basic positions of both countries, 
especially the Turkish officials, regarding the implications of U.S. requests. Finally, in 
the last section, the 2003 crisis is analyzed through the lessons of 1964. 
The analysis of the 1964 Crisis shows that both U.S. and Turkey would have five 
main sources of influence over their foreign policy decisions leading to disagreement in 
1964: the dynamics in the U.S. Turkish relations; domestic concerns of both countries; 
the presence of unaligned goals regarding the same issue; the international circumstances; 
and the influence of signaling failures and previous interactions. When we analyze the 
2003 Crisis in light of these findings we see that all the main issues seem to be 
consistently relevant, though their effects might have changed slightly.  
The dynamics in U.S.-Turkey relations in both 1964 and 2003 continued to be one 
between a global power and a medium power in the framework of a global threat that 
required regional cooperation. In 1964 the global threat was communism. In 2003 it was 
Islamic terrorism. In both cases the priority of the global power was the fight against the 
global threat and this created expectations from the medium power ally in the region, 
who –in both cases- had its own reservations about the issue, considering its own national 
interests. This created unaligned goals in Turkey and U.S., making it harder to cooperate. 
In both cases, though the crisis erupted over foreign policy issues, the roots of 
disagreement were affected by domestic considerations, as well. In 1964, the looming 
presidential elections and the presence of a sizable Greek-American community 
influenced the U.S. policy makers, while, at the same time, the strong sensitivity of the 
Turkish public forced the Turkish government to take a tougher stance over Cyprus. In 
2003, U.S. did not have any domestic concerns regarding the issue, but the newly elected 
Turkish government was under intense pressure from the public which was 
overwhelmingly against a U.S. invasion in Iraq.  In both 1964 and 2003, the international 
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circumstances played a significant role. In 1964, the overall support of the international 
community to the Greek Cypriots made it easier for U.S. to follow a policy against 
Turkish desires, while the lack of international support, and the lack of legal justification 
-- which was required by the Turkish Constitution for Turkey to accept U.S. demands-- 
for a U.S. invasion in 2003, made it harder for Turkish officials to jump on the same 
wagon.  
Both U.S. and Turkey suffered from signaling failures, and the different effects of 
earlier interactions in 1964 as well as in 2003. In 1964, the previous Turkish threats of 
intervention and the resulting compromises from U.S. were interpreted differently by 
Turkey and U.S. Some Turkish officials over exaggerated the gains from these threats so 
much as to resort to these threats as a policy tool, and when they recognized that their 
effect had decreased, they felt it necessary to actually do something in order bring a 
change in the deteriorating situation. But, when Turkey had actually decided to follow 
through its words, U.S. had concluded that this was merely a bluff to extract some 
concessions. In 2003, the different interpretation of the historical memory of strong 
cooperation between U.S. and Turkey during the 2nd Gulf War caused different 
expectations and considerations. U.S. remembered the strong and willing cooperation 
from Turkey in 1991 and expected even more cooperation in 2003. Turkey, on the other 
hand, remembered 1991 as an instance when it ended up paying a high prize for 
cooperating with the U.S., together with the unfulfilled promises of the U.S. officials.   
Overall, both cases emphasize the five significant factors that determine how 
large global and medium regional powers interact:  the dynamics in the relations between 
the two countries; the presence of unaligned goals; domestic concerns of both countries; 





II. U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS, THE CYPRUS CRISIS AND THE 
U.S. CYPRUS POLICY BEFORE DECEMBER 1963 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Johnson letter of June 1964 has three aspects that are important: The Turkish 
American relations, the Cyprus dispute, and the U.S. policy over Cyprus. Therefore, in 
order to understand the events of June 1964, and the way both U.S. and Turkey behaved 
the way they did, we need to examine these three aspects respectively before delving into 
the immediate events surrounding the Johnson letter. 
First, the Johnson letter is an issue that has greatly changed some aspects of 
Turkish American relations. Therefore, before going into the details of the 1963 crisis in 
Cyprus and the eventual Johnson letter of June 1964, it is important, for a number of 
reasons, to examine the main events in the history of the alliance up to then. This will 
provide the opportunity to identify the motives of the two countries in forming closer 
relations, and point out the basic characteristics of the relations, (i.e., is it  military, 
political, economic, or all these ?). It will be helpful in analyzing the dynamics in the 
Turkish American relationship, the expectations of both countries from the other 
(especially Turkey’s expectations from U.S.) in 1964, and, more specifically, the reason 
for disappointment on the Turkish side. We will examine cases of conflicting interests 
before 1963, the way they reacted to these situations, and the effects of those previous 
cases on the view of the two countries against the other. Touching the main points in the 
relations up to the 1963 crisis, we will be able to put the events in 1964 in a broader 
historical context, helping us to see the picture more clearly.  
Second, the Johnson letter is inextricably linked to the Cyprus dispute, and 
concerned the parties in the conflict, both on the island (Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots) and outside of it (Greece, Turkey, and Britain). The Turkish decision to 
intervene in the island, which prompted the Johnson letter, was a reaction to the events on 
the island. Therefore we need to talk generally about the way the Cyprus conflict 
emerged and evolved over the years until 1963, when the major crisis that lead to the 
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Johnson letter commenced. Knowing the events in Cyprus will enable us determine how 
they affected U.S. and Turkey , and understand especially why Turkey acted the way it 
did, as well as what historical memory would justify Turkish intervention in 1964 and 
how external parties got involved in the issue. 
Third, the Johnson letter is also an embodiment of U.S. policy towards Cyprus. It 
greatly affected the form of the resolution of the problem at that moment. By sending the 
letter to Turkey, U.S. showed clearly to the parties that it had a Cyprus policy, and would 
not let the resolution of the problem against its terms. That brings us the question of what 
that policy was. But, another aspect of this issue is; whether that policy was new, or it had 
evolved in time in response to the events. To understand that, we need to know what U.S. 
policy towards Cyprus was in the 1950s up until the 1963 crisis. We will examine where 
U.S. stood pertaining the eventual solution to the problem, what its priorities were, and 
how they played out. Therefore, when we examine the U.S. policy of Cyprus in 1964, we 
will be able to identify a change if there is one, and query the reasons of that change.  The 
Cyprus conflict initially developed as a problem between Britain, Greek Cypriots and 
Greece before it turned into a Greek-Turkish dispute. Since U.S. policy in 1960s would 
be based on neutrality between two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey), it is important to 
examine what U.S. position was when the dispute involved two different NATO allies, 
i.e. Greece and Britain instead of Greece and Turkey. This will help us see whether U.S. 
position would change once the countries concerned were different.  
Fourth, as we examine the U.S. policy over Cyprus and its repercussions to the 
Turkish American relations, we will be looking for lessons that could be applicable in 
2003 during the Iraq crisis in terms of determining potential disagreement points and 
basing the expectations of both countries from the other on a more reasonable level.  We 
will be looking for reasons for disagreement between U.S. and Turkey that were relevant  
both in 1964 and 2003, and underline those that could have guided the policy makers of 
both countries to reach a more realistic understanding of the Turkish American relations 
together with potential trouble spots and possible remedies to prevent them from harming 
the relations in 2003.  
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B. TURKISH AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1963   
Since the Johnson letter contained expressions questioning the U.S. readiness to 
help Turkey against a Soviet intervention, it is important to point out the fact that, the 
primary reason that pushed Turkey out of neutralist stance during WWII into the Western 
camp was the threat from the Soviets, who had been the traditional enemies of the 
Ottoman State for centuries. In addition to the century old Turkish quest for becoming a 
member of the Western family, Turkey was in a way “forced into the Western camp 
because of the Soviet threat” 3 or as Khrushchev put it: the Soviet demands “succeeded in 
frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans”.4 On March 1945, the 
Soviets officially denounced the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey. This was 
followed by another demand on June 7 1945, asking for a base on the straits and some 
territorial concessions in the eastern part of Turkey. Despite initial lack of U.S. response 
against these threats, considering the Soviet actions in Iran5 and with the effect of the 
Turkish campaign emphasizing the importance of Turkey’s geographical position as the 
key to Middle East,6 U.S. concluded that it was vital to prevent the Soviet Union from 
obtaining control over Turkey.7 The Truman administration was convinced that the 
Soviets intended to attack Turkey “unless they were faced with an iron fist and strong 
language”8 Therefore, United States adopted a harsh stance against the Soviet demands, 
which eventually caused the Soviets to back down. 
Thus, the arrival of U.S.S Missouri in İstanbul on April 1946, which marked the 
beginning of a stronger relationship between the two countries, was a much celebrated 
event in Turkey. The ship was merely bearing the remains of the late Turkish 
                                                 
3 William Hale,  Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000(London, Frank Cass, 2002), 110 
4 Bruce R. Kuniholm, Turkey and the West Since the WWII in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig 
Nation(ed.), Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising regional Power (Westview 
Press, 1996), 45 
5 Hale,  Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 111 
6 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance : Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-
1971 (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise For Public Policy Research, 1972), 18 
7  Kuniholm, Turkey and the West Since the WWII, 46 
8 Quoted in : Harris, Troubled Alliance, 19  from Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol.1 :Years of 
Decisions (Garden  City, N.Y.), .522 
 10
Ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegun, who had died in Washington 
in 1944. But the signal being sent to the U.S.S.R. and the Turkish public was clear. 
Together with the decline of Britain as a world power, U.S. replaced its role in 
Turkey and Greece as a supporter of these two countries. Since the end of the World War 
II, Britain was providing support to the Greek and Turkish governments but it was not 
effective in this support against the U.S.S.R. There was a danger of the Greek 
government being replaced by a pro-Soviet one, and the Soviets were pressuring Turkey 
for territorial concessions. Britain, unable to fulfill its role, announced its withdrawal of 
aid to Turkey and Greece asking U.S. to fill in. U.S., on the other hand, had  begun to 
return to the policy of isolation after the end of World War II. There was a near-
consensus in the American public as well as the Congress for withdrawal to the continent. 
Yet, the events up to 1947- the Soviet threats against Iran and Turkey, and their support 
for the communists in Greece- persuaded the American administration that the Soviet 
Union was undertaking expansionist policies in the Near and Middle East. 
Thus, on 12 March, 1947 Truman made a speech announcing a new American 
policy to “… support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures [….].”9 In the end, it amounted to $400 million aid to 
Greece and Turkey,($300 million to Greece and $100 million to Turkey). 
The Truman Doctrine is very important for a number of reasons: First, it was 
aimed at strengthening Turkey and Greece against the common enemy, the Soviets, or 
‘communism’ as another way to put it. Second, it was a support to the would-be 
conflicting parties in the Cyprus conflict, Turkey and Greece. Third, it was a turning 
point in Turkish American relations, as well as American foreign policy. Turkey was, for 
the first time, receiving aid from U.S. and the Turks now felt that they were “no more 
isolated”.10 It “signified the formal emergence of the United States as Turkey’s chief 
supporter in the West” and associated Turkey formally with the U.S., conveying new 
                                                 
9 George Kousoulias, The Success of the Truman Doctrine Was not Accidental, Military Affairs,  29, 
no. 2(Summer, 1965), 88 originally  from: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs; 1946-1952,Years of Trial and Hope, 
vol 2, A Signet Book (1965),  125-128          
10 Hale,  Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, 115 
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confidence in the country’s security.11 United States was committing itself to make 
material contribution to Turkey’s security, which was a clear message to the Soviet 
Union. And Turkey now had the means to modernize its army.12 Fourth, as the forerunner 
of the Marshall plan and the establishment of NATO, it may be called as the first instance 
of the Cold War and the first glimpse of the ‘containment’ policy of the U.S. against the 
Soviets.13    
Simultaneously with the onset of the cold war, a “special relationship” between 
Turkey and U.S. was originated. In addition to the visit of U.S.S Missouri in 1946, and 
the Truman Doctrine of 1947, U.S. and Turkey signed a military assistance agreement on 
July, 1947, more than four years before Turkey’s entrance to NATO. The assistance 
included weaponry, equipment, as well as training aspects.14 
Though The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established In April 1949 
Turkey’s initial attempts to join the alliance failed because of strong opposition from 
some European countries. Some worried about its affect on the European Unity, while 
some countries had concerns about a reduction of the military aid they themselves. The 
British had their own designs for Turkey as a central power in the Middle East. 
Especially after the oil crisis with Iran in 1951, Britain’s priority was the defense of the 
Middle East in general, and the Suez Canal in particular. The British viewed Turkey as 
the leader of Middle East. They wanted to form a defense organization, which would not 
only include the Arab States, but Turkey and Israel as well.15  
During this period Turkey went through the second of its multiparty elections, 
which resulted in the victory of the DP(Democrat Party) under the leadership of Adnan 
Menderes, and less than a month later, in June 1950, the invasion of South Korea by 
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North Korea presented the new government an opportunity to win the hearts of the West. 
The Menderes government immediately decided to send a combat brigade of 4,500 men 
to the war. 16  Close to 30,000 Turks served in this war, with about 10% casualties, 
impressing the allied commanders with their actions, leading General Douglas McArthur 
to call them: “the bravest of the brave”. This symbolic move from Turkey, which was 
also a “clear demonstration of its potential contribution,” was a result of its willingness to 
join the alliance and obtain a security guarantee from the United States.17 Thus, building 
on the sympathy attained from its decisive action, Turkey applied for NATO membership 
on August 1, 1950.             
The strategic view of the defense of Europe, as outlined by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower - the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe -, determined Turkey’s role and 
its relationship with the West.18 According to Eisenhower, Europe had the shape of “a 
long bottleneck”. The neck of the bottle was Western Europe, with Spain being the end. 
The wide part was Russia. There were bodies of water on both sides of the bottle.19The 
West had the control of these bodies of water as well as land on the other sides of them. 
On one side, there was England behind the North Sea, and on the other side were the 
Near East and South Africa behind the Mediterranean. The West needed to rely on land 
forces in the center, while applying great air and sea power on both sides. Turkey and 
Yugoslavia would be armed, while a great fleet of air and sea power should be put in the 
Mediterranean. Thus, in case Russia made a move towards the center, the West would 
strike it strongly form both sides.20 Also, a control of the Soviet Union in Turkey would 
threaten the Western oil interests as well as the economic viability of Europe. And the 
inclusion of Turkey, which was the only country in the eastern Mediterranean seen as 
capable of prolonged resistance against Russia, would force the Soviets to commit 
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considerable forces away from the European theater. In other worlds, there was a 
“mutuality of benefits” in the Turkish-American relationship.21 
Thus, despite some concerns in the alliance that extending the borders of NATO 
the borders of the Soviet Union might be too “provocative,”22 Turkey’s membership was 
accepted in September 1951. Turkey and Greece became full members of NATO in 
February1952.  
During the Eisenhower administration, Turkey and U.S. established closer 
military relations. In 1955 Turkey joined the Baghdad pact, of which Britain, Iraq, 
Pakistan and Iran became members and U.S. was an active supporter -though not an 
official member.23 In 1956 U-2 planes were stationed in İncirlik and electronic 
surveillance and intelligence installations were set up on the Black Sea coast. In 1957 
U.S. even stationed military aircrafts with tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey. In January 
1957 U.S. announced the Eisenhower doctrine, which proposed to offer aid to any Middle 
East country threatened by communism Military assistance to Turkey during the 
Eisenhower administration was on average $200 million a year.24   
Despite close military cooperation during this era, one inappropriate use of the 
İncirlik base planted in the Turkish mind seeds of questions about the alliance. In 1958, 
Lebanese government asked for U.S. help against an armed insurrection which was 
inspired by the fall of the Iraqi regime. U.S. accepted the request and sent military forces 
to support the Lebanese government. Since the event required rapid action, U.S. deployed 
some of its forces through the İncirlik base in Turkey, though only with notification, 
rather than with prior consultation. 25 
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The Lebanon case has a number of significant implications that are worth 
mentioning. First of all, despite the emergency of the matter, the lack of a U.S. request 
for permission – even though it might be argued that Turkey would probably grant it 
anyway – created resentment. Despite the government’s avoidance of any negative 
comments about this, the opposition criticized the U.S. action as an “abuse of Turkish 
sovereignty” and claimed that “U.S. was defending its own interests to the detriment of 
Turkey’s”26. Second, it started a process of reassessment in Turkey about the Turkish 
commitment to NATO. The main question was regarding the scope of collaboration:  
Would it be only against the Soviets, or would it be a more general cooperation with the 
alliance on a global scope?27 Third, Turkish soil was for the first time 28 being used as a 
launch pad for U.S. Middle East policy. It would be “recalled with regret” in the 1960s, 
when Turkey moved to a more pro-Arab posture.29  Fourth, the relative ease which the 
U.S. operated with illuminates the underlying conviction that Turkish cooperation was 
taken for granted. Fifth, it is the first instance when the opposition criticized the 
government for collaboration with the U.S. against Turkish national interests. And last, 
but not the least, United States, as a global power, was prioritizing its own regional 
interests over those of its ally, Turkey. This is a pattern we will continue to see both in 
the Cuban Missile crisis and the Cyprus crisis.  
The Lebanon crisis did not profoundly damage Turkish-American relations.  By 
the end of the 1960s, together with the sympathy gained from the Korean war, and the 
“impressive steadfastness against Russia”, Turkey had become “the ideal ally” in the eyes 
of the Americans. 30 
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The removal of the Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey as a result of the 
negotiations with the Soviets over the Cuban missile crisis is one of the important events 
in the history of U.S.-Turkish relations, which, if handled carelessly, could have harmed 
the relations much more than it eventually did.  
Deployment of middle range nuclear missiles in NATO was agreed in the NATO 
Council meeting of December 195631, with only Britain, Italy and Turkey(despite strong 
criticism from U.S.S.R.) accepting to station them on their soil. In 1959 Turkey and U.S. 
agreed to station a squadron of Jupiter missiles in İzmir32, but , due to necessary technical 
preparations the missiles did not become operational until July 1962, and by that time 
they had already become obsolete. The important thing about the missiles was that they 
were given to Turkey as military aid, making them actual property of Turkey33, and only 
the nuclear warheads were under the total control of U.S.34They were under the 
operational control of SACEUR, and their use was subject to the agreement of both U.S. 
and Turkey35 with a double key system, though they would be activated by Turkish 
crews. 36 
More than a year before the Cuban Missile crisis took shape, on April 6 1961, 
President Kennedy had asked the Departments of State and Defense, and Central 
Intelligence Agency to review the deployment of the missiles to Turkey,37 but since 
Turkish military leaders considered them important for the defense of their country, the 
issue was dropped. When U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk again raised the topic with 
the Turkish representative at the NATO council meeting in spring 1962, the result was 
the same.38 
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The Turkish rationale for the presence of the missiles was more political and 
psychological than military, regarding them as an indication of NATO’s determination to 
use nuclear weapons against a Russian attack, and feeling an assurance from the fact that 
the weapons were on Turkish territory and somewhat in Turkish hands .The American 
reasoning about the issue was that : the missiles had little if any military value; they 
provided target for Soviet attack; and the new Polaris system was superior. U.S. also had 
some concerns about a “risk of war by miscalculation” (through a unilateral action of 
Turks, or a preemptive action of Soviets in case an international crisis).39 The 
perspectives of the two countries openly diverged.  U.S. was considering the case in 
terms of its own interest and in a broad view of NATO. Since the Polaris missiles would 
do the same job anyway, the absence of Jupiters would not create any security viability to 
U.S. or NATO.  For Turkey, on the other hand, the issue was a matter of National 
Security. Their absence would be regarded as a security liability. Global needs of the 
alliance as perceived by U.S. and the National Interests of Turkey failed converge, 
creating disagreement. This is a pattern we will see in the Cyprus crisis as well. 
For the following reasons, the U.S. government  concluded not to cancel the 
deployment of missiles: 1-)such an action would be interpreted as a sign of weakness in 
the aftermath of the Vienna summit of 1961;40 2-)that Turkish reaction would be strongly 
adverse; 3-) since SACEUR , General Norstad, had already expressed his opinion 
underlining the importance the  missiles to Turkish foreign Minister, it wouldn’t be 
possible to persuade the Turkish military  to abandon the project anymore. 41 
Later came the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had entered its last phase after 
Khrushchev ’e letter to Kennedy on 26, October, asking the U.S. to stop denying access 
to ships to the island and give a formal guarantee not to attack Cuba, in exchange for the 
removal of Soviet missiles from the island, since their presence was for ‘defensive’ 
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purposes, and once the defense of Cuba was guaranteed, there would be no need for those 
weapons42. But, the next day, on October 27, 1962, Khrushchev sent another letter to 
Kennedy requesting the removal of the Jupiters in Turkey in return for the removal of 
Soviet weapons from Cuba.43  
The sensitiveness of Turkey on the issue arose from the fact that, with those 
missiles, Turkey had a nuclear missile system which belonged to Turkey, which Turkey 
was beginning to man, and over which Turkey had partial control.44Moreover, the 
Turkish Parliament had only recently appropriated the financing of their deployment.45 
Both considering the Turkish reaction because of the implication that U.S. was 
trading Turkish interests in order to appease the Soviets, and also to avoid further 
demands from Khrushchev, Kennedy chose to ignore the second letter and reply only to 
the first letter.46 But, being aware of the relatively little military value of the missiles in 
Turkey, Kennedy also had prior thoughts about the issue. He believed that trading the 
missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba -which added “50%” to the nuclear 
capability of the Soviet Union- would be of significant military value, and he also 
thought that U.S. was in a position of risking a war with Russia over obsolete missiles in 
Turkey, which would make the U.S. appear to be attacking Cuba “for the purpose of 
keeping useless missiles in Turkey”47 Thus, he instructed his brother Robert to inform the 
Soviets that once the Soviet weapons were removed from Cuba, Jupiters in Turkey would 
soon be withdrawn as well, though publicly U.S. never accepted that there was any kind 
of ‘deal’ with the Soviets regarding the issue and the U.S. government never notified 
Turkey about it.48 Robert Kennedy’s published memoirs of the Cuban missile crisis 
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called Thirteen Days deny that there was any “deal of any kind,” and  these memoirs 
have generally been interpreted as containing merely an “implicit” missile-trade. But, 
Ted Sorensen, the editor of Robert Kennedy’s notes for publication, has later conceded 
that the memoirs were in fact “very explicit that [the Jupiter concession] was part of the 
deal.49  The missiles were removed in April 1963. 
The way Cuban missile Crisis turned out left a lasting influence on Turkish-
American relations. It aroused suspicions about the inextricable link between the NATO 
members. It presented to the Turks a clear example of the possibility of an unexpected 
war, and made clear to Turkey that presence of some dangerous weapons on its soil could 
make Turkey a target for the Soviet weapons. Turkey would thereafter feel the need to be 
much more careful in its dealings with both U.S. and the Soviets.50 The removal of the 
missiles “gave Turkey the feeling that it was no more than a pawn in the American 
game”51. Also, the removal of mid-range nuclear missiles, despite the continuing 
presence of tactical nuclear weapons, significantly decreased Turkey’s strategic 
importance in a nuclear war.52  
Yet, for many years, Turkey did not learn that U.S. was quite ready to make a deal 
with the Soviets-the common enemy- a deal regarding vital Turkish interests, without any 
consultation. Since the issue did not become public like the ‘Johnson letter’ it did not 
create great disappointment in the Turkish public. Also, the previous attempt of the 
removal of the missiles in 1962 served as a justification and gave the appearance of a 
policy requirement that was irrelevant to Cuba.53  No question was raised during their 
removal about their relevance to a deal between Washington and Moscow.54 In February  
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1963, Turkish Foreign Minister told the National Assembly that the missiles would be 
removed because they were obsolete and they were “of little help” to the protection of 
Turkey.55 
In summary, it is true that both Turkey and U.S. had benefits to gain from forming 
a stronger relationship. The presence of a common enemy made them natural allies. Both 
countries had an interest in maintaining close ties. But it is also true that they had 
different perspectives arising from their own geographic and global statuses. U.S. was a 
global power that had global strategic interests, to which it expected Turkey to conform. 
Turkey did conform to the U.S. policies, with a very strong zeal, in fact. But, soon 
Turkey would slowly come to realize that the national interests of Turkey and U.S. would 
not always be identical. 
The relations between the two countries were based on a security alliance in the 
framework of NATO. Turkey was an important part of NATO plans, and an important 
country in the southeastern flank of NATO, close to Middle East, as well as on the border 
of Russia. Moreover, the bases and communications facilities in Turkey provided 
intelligence facilities against the Russians.  For Turkey, NATO meant U.S. The principal 
motivation of Turkey in the relations with U.S. was obtaining a security guarantee against 
the Soviets. Every other issue was secondary. The main motivation behind Turkish 
willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on other irrelevant issues was to maintain this 
guarantee.                                 
During the period up to 1963, although there were some cases of conflicting 
interests, these issues did not give a substantial damage to the relations. Yet, there was an 
underlying difference in the perspectives of Turkey and U.S. towards the relations, which 
would surface in the Cyprus Crisis.    
C. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS IN CYPRUS UP TO 1963 
 The Cyprus dispute is a very old and complicated problem that would require a 
very lengthy analysis In my overview of the events until 1963, I will not delve into the 
long historical detail of the Cyprus conflict. This is not in the scope of this thesis. 
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Therefore we will merely give the account of main events concerning the dispute, to be 
able to see the interactions of Turkey and U.S. in this framework. 
 Cyprus is an island in the north east part of the Mediterranean. It is the biggest 
island in the Mediterranean with a size of 3, 372 square miles. It is about 500 miles to 
Greek mainland, 240 miles to Egypt, 60 Miles to Syria, and only 40 miles to southern 
Turkey.56 The location of the island needs to be mentioned, because it had an important 
role in the concerns and policies of both U.S. and Turkey. Since it was very close to 
Turkey, Turks would see the fall of it under a hostile domination – be it Greek or 
communist- as a threat to their country. When viewed together with the presence of 
numerous Greek islands on the west and southwest of Turkey, a hostile Cyprus would 
mean the encirclement of Turkey by enemies. U.S., on the other hand, would be 
concerned about preventing any Soviet influence in the island because of its importance 
as a base in the Mediterranean, and its strategic location. U.S., as a global power, and 
Turkey, as a regional partner, would have different perspectives regarding the same issue. 
 Much of the history of the conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots is based on the Greek Cypriot struggle for “enosis”- union of Cyprus with 
Greece-, and the Turkish Cypriot attempts to prevent it.  Therefore, it is worth 
mentioning the emergence and development of the enosis idea very briefly.  Never in 
history was Cyprus a part of Greece, but the idea of uniting all the Greek people in one 
state, which was called “Megali Idea”- great idea-, was born after Greece had gained its 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1828. 57 Cyprus was an Ottoman territory 
since 1571. The British occupation of the island started in 1878, though it officially 
remained under Ottoman rule until 1914, when the British annexed the island.58 The 
Greek Cypriot will for “union with motherland” was always present, but it did not gain 
international attention until the 1950s, when Greek Cypriots started a more assertive 
campaign to achieve this goal 
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 One important dimension of the Cyprus conflict is its aspect as a “bone of 
contention” between Greece and Turkey. One of the main motivations of Johnson for 
sending his letter in June 1964 was the belief that a Turkish intervention would cause a 
war between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, it might be helpful to be aware of how the 
relations between them evolved during the crisis. Until the 1950s Greece and Turkey had 
good relations, and Greece did not support the enosis. The involvement of Greece in the 
enosis struggle started after February 1951, when Greece made it an official national 
policy to support enosis. Turkey and Greece had joined NATO in February 1952, signed 
“a Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in February 1953, and had formed the Balkan Pact 
together with Yugoslavia in August 1954.59  But, as Greece became more involved in the 
struggle for enosis, it was inevitable that relations between Turkey and Greece would 
deteriorate. By 1955, the historical animosity between the Turks and Greeks had been 
revived. One important indication of this was the anti-Greek riots in İstanbul and İzmir in 
Turkey in September 1955.60 
 During the early 1950s, Greece tried to resolve the issue through U.N., but Britain 
managed to avert the discussion of the matter in U.N. by claiming that it was an 
“internal” matter of the UK. 61 The armed struggle of the Greek Cypriots for self 
determination started in April 1955, and continued until 1959. At the initial stage of the 
rebellion, it was a matter between Britain and the Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots were 
against independence, because they thought it would lead to enosis. The incorporation of 
the Turkish Cypriots into the police force by the British further worsened relations 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In August 1955 Turkey initially demanded the 
return of the island to Turkey62, but by the end of 1956 Turkey changed its policy to 
demanding the separate self-determination right of Turkish Cypriots and taksim 
(partition, division of the island among Greeks and Turks). After 1957, Greeks would 
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modify their demands arguing for “self-determination” and independence of Cyprus 
which would in effect be a “transitional stage” for enosis.63 
 Turkey was initially reluctant to get involved in the Cyprus problem because it 
thought Britain was resolute to keep the island. Active Turkish involvement in the dispute 
actually began after Britain decided to “shake [Turkey] out of its passivity” in June 1955 
in order to strengthen its own position by inviting Turkey and Greece to a joint 
conference to discuss the Cyprus problem.64 By the end of November 1957, the main 
adversary of the Greeks on the issue of Cyprus had by now become Turkey, instead of 
Britain.65 
 During the period of 1955-1959, a number of different plans were proposed by 
different parties (mostly by the British, once by U.S.). Turkey refused to accept most of 
these proposals for the self government of Cyprus arguing that they did not rule out 
enosis, while Greece refused these plans because “enosis was not clearly identified as an 
eventual result of self government.” These would be the main positions of the two 
countries throughout the late 1950s to all the different proposals.66 It is important to note 
here the stern Turkish stance against enosis, because when it came to 1964, U.S. would 
be arguing that enosis would “satisfy” Turkish concerns over Cyprus. 
 As the issue began to be handled in the U.N., the Cyprus conflict gained an 
international character. This was for the most part to the benefit of the Greek side because 
of the Soviet and Third World support to their struggle for “self-determination,” but the 
1958 Middle East crisis turned the tide against the Greeks. In July 1958 Iraq’s Hashemite 
dynasty, which was friendly to the British, was toppled. U.S. and Britain went in to help 
the Lebanon Government, which was in the danger of facing the same fate. The details of 
the crisis is not our concern here, but the Middle East crisis had an unexpected side effect 
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on the Cyprus question. It strengthened Turkey’s position, 67 because the West became 
more conscious of the importance of Turkey as an ally in that volatile region. This clearly 
shows that the Cyprus dispute was not immune to the influence of international 
circumstances. The strength of the positions of the parties in the dispute would be greatly 
affected by not only their own strength and the logic of their arguments, but also by the 
level of international support they could acquire. A change in the international opinion 
could suddenly turn the tide against one of the parties.  In 1964, international opinion 
would be overwhelmingly pro-Greek, which would be one of the reasons for the U.S. 
policy to shift against Turkey. Therefore it is important to point out that there was a 
similar example to the opposite effect in the history of the Cyprus conflict. 
 In February 1959, bilateral talks between first Greece and Turkey, which later 
included the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, resulted in agreement for the independence for 
Cyprus. The London-Zurich accords, signed on 19 February started a new era in the 
history of Cyprus.68 The constitution, signed on 16 August 1960,69 established the 
Republic of Cyprus as an independent state. It banned partition as well as “union with 
any other State.” Three treaties shaped the new state’s statue. The Treaty of 
Establishment designated 99sq. miles of Cyprus territory as sovereign British bases. The 
Treaty of Alliance created a Tripartite headquarters in Cyprus, and stationed 950 Greek, 
650 Turkish military personnel on the island. The Treaty of Guarantee designated 
Turkey, Greece, and Britain to guarantee the territorial integrity and independence of 
Cyprus,  as  well  as “the state of affairs established by the 1960 Constitution”. Article IV  
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of the Treaty of Guarantee was especially significant, because it would be legal 
justification of Turkish threats to intervene in the face of the Governmental crisis that 
broke out in 1963: 70 
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the 
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole 
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. 
 The constitution was based on the principle of avoiding the dominance of one 
community over the other. It instituted an “intricate system of checks and balances 
designed to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority without paralyzing the 
state’s ability to function as a sovereign state which had become a member of the United 
Nations in the year of its independence.”71 Some provisions of the constitution would 
make the administration of the country more difficult. The main problem was the absence 
of trust between the two communities to make such a complex system work. Thus, 
troubles began almost immediately after independence.72A series of disagreements 
emerged between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Broadly,  Greek Cypriots 
continuously demanded amendment of the constitution, while Turkish Cypriots insisted 
on its full implementation.73 
 Makarios, as President of the independent Cyprus Republic, repeatedly demanded 
the changing of the constitution, arguing that it was unworkable. After independence, as 
he saw that the West was all in favor of the status-quo, Makarios sought to obtain the 
support of the Third World as well as the Soviets in the U.N. And, at the same time, he 
continued to violate the articles of the constitution regarding the rights of the Turkish 
Cypriots.74  The Greek government did not support the Greek Cypriot demands until May 
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1963. Starting by suggesting the revision of the London agreements on 11 May 1963,75 
the Greek government thereafter became an active supporter of the Greek Cypriot 
demands for amending the constitution. 
 Greek Cypriot government had made a plan -later called the “Akritas plan”- 
which had the ultimate goal of enosis by suppressing the Turkish community. The 
Turkish Cypriots would be “suppressed” in a few days, preventing outside intervention 
and facilitating subsequent actions.76 On November 3 1963, in a church congregation in 
Paralimini, Makarios had stated : “ What is our desire? We have proclaimed it many 
times: our union with the motherland, eternal Greece … [t]he struggle will continue until 
complete fulfillment.”77 
 On 30 November 1963, Makarios submitted his 13 proposals for the amendment 
of the constitution The proposals would create an “integrated unitary state [with majority 
rule and] some limited guarantees for the Turkish community.”78.  
 Turkish Cypriots believed that a compromise with Makarios regarding the 
constitution would open the way for the constitution to be “swept away”.79 This Turkish 
Cypriot view was shared by the Turkish Government, which was also concerned that a 
collapse of the system in Cyprus would lead to enosis.80   
 It is now widely accepted that Greek Cypriot government had made a plan -later 
called the “Akritas plan”- which had the ultimate goal of enosis by suppressing the 
Turkish community. The Turkish Cypriots would be “suppressed” in a few days, 
preventing outside intervention and facilitating subsequent actions.81 On November 3 
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1963, in a church congregation in Paralimini, Makarios had stated: “What is our desire? 
We have proclaimed it many times: our union with the motherland, eternal Greece … 
[t]he struggle will continue until complete fulfillment.”82 
 Britain had been a supporter of the Turkish Cypriot community before 
independence. But after 1960, Britain completely reversed its position. London was 
persuaded that it had long-term interests in Cyprus regarding the SBAs they stationed on 
the island. And in order to safeguard these interests, Britain would support the Greek 
Cypriots.83By the end of October Britain’s reluctance to mediate in the problem became 
clear to U.S.84 Britain felt it was dependent on the goodwill of Makarios because of the 
British bases on the island. U.S. became slowly more and more involved in the Cyprus 
problem.85  
D. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS FROM 1950S UNTIL 1963 
 In the early fifties, U.S. policy towards Cyprus had been a policy of “non-
involvement”. The Cyprus problem was considered to be a matter between the Cypriots 
and the British. U.S. thinking was affected by various components. The “anti-colonialist” 
approach, which was a popular feeling among the Americans at the time, was favoring 
the Cypriot nationalists. The anti-communist approach, which suspected that the real 
force behind the mutinies in the colonies was communism, worked against taking the 
issue to the  U.N. because this would provide an opportunity for Soviets to gain influence 
and exploit the problem. And close relations (“special relationship”) with the British, who 
wanted to preserve their rule of the island, prevented U.S. from taking a position against 
Britain.86 Thus, the U.S. position as expressed in July 1952 by Dean Acheson, U.S. 
Secretary of State, was that: “U.S. not party to [the] problem”, but the matter should not 
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be taken to the U.N. This would, Acheson argued, damage the Greek-Turk “amity” which 
was developed through great care, and cause a strong Turkish reaction in the U.N.87  
 During the upheaval on the island first between the Greek Cypriots and the 
British, later between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and during the 
negotiations regarding the Cyprus problem until 1960, U.S. was an “ interesting observer, 
but not a participant.”88  U.S. did not try to impose any sort of solution, but also followed 
the events very closely to prevent the issue to be resolved in a way that would threaten 
the U.S. interests. It had its own priorities, and observed the development of events very 
closely sometimes by supporting specific proposals, sometimes suggesting its own 
solutions- though never forcing them-. As long as the solution of the problem satisfied 
the U.S. priorities, it would not object to any kind of solution. U.S. continually tried to 
refrain from taking sides in the conflict. U.S. favored the solution to be in terms granting  
Turkey a base on the island in exchange for unitary self-determination. But, U.S. also 
preferred to remain uninvolved as long as the British went along implementing their own 
proposals.89   
 U.S. viewed the problem from the perspective of the cold war.90 This created two 
main priorities. One was the preservation of NATO solidarity, the other was prevention 
of Soviet influence in Cyprus and the Mediterranean. The latter necessitated avoiding 
taking the matter to the United Nations. Because, since the problem was between NATO 
members, there would be a split in NATO about the support for either party, and even if 
there was no split at least one member of the alliance would probably be alienated. The 
Soviets, and more specifically the communist bloc, would exploit this weakness. They 
would support the Greek Cypriots for their struggle for independence. Britain, Greece, 
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and Turkey were all NATO members. Therefore the Soviet bloc was both against British 
rule of the island and enosis, as well as it was against partition. Because, all of these 
options would mean NATO presence on the island. An independent Cyprus, on the other 
hand, would probably be “non-aligned,” which, especially considering the sizable 
strength of the communists among the Greek Cypriots would bring Soviet influence to 
the strategically located island and thereupon to the Mediterranean. Therefore, U.S. was 
strongly against the issue going to the U.N. It feared that such an action would have 
“extremely deleterious effects in Aegean”, and provide the Soviets with an opportunity to 
exploit the disagreement between NATO members.91 U.S. wanted the issue to be solved 
through negotiations among the concerned parties. The U.S. concern about a “split 
among NATO partners” gained even higher priority after the anti-Greek riots in Turkey 
in September 1955.  U.S. now feared “an irreparable disruption of NATO’s southeastern 
flank”. This concern affected the U.S. policy in the U.N. meeting of the same month, in 
which U.S. voted against the “inscription”, taking a position against Greece.92 By April 
1957, the main U.S. concern would become the “reestablishment of good relations 
between [Turkey] and [Greece].” 93U.S. would always look at the issue in terms of the 
Cold war, and maybe too much so, to the point of disregarding the bilateral aspect of the 
dispute among the conflicting parties.  
 The U.S. perspective of the issue as a Cold War phenomenon influenced its 
expectations form the parties as well. It expected the conflicting NATO members in the 
Cyprus dispute to view the problem from the same perspective as the U.S. did, ignore 
their grievances and disagreements and focus on NATO solidarity. There are a number of 
occasions that illustrate this point: After the anti-Greek riots of September 1955 in 
Turkey, U.S. would urge the two countries to “subordinate their bilateral differences to 
the larger interests of NATO and their special relationship with United States.”94  In 
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1956, when U.S. developed a proposal which had unfavorable terms for Turkey,95 
“Turkey would have to be convinced that going along with it would serve the more 
important NATO interests.”96 Again, in January 1957, when the Cyprus issue was once 
more taken to the U.N., U.S. was frustrated when a resolution calling for negotiations 
among the three parties was rejected. U.S. leaders argued: “major issues of preserving 
NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of Mediterranean [were] being 
subordinated to the lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interests of three parties 
concerned therewith.”97 In September 1958, when Turkey was gaining the upper hand in 
the Cyprus dispute after the Lebanon Crisis, U.S. would tell Greece that the latter had 
better “measure its immediate objectives respecting Cyprus against its bond of interest 
against other nations of the West.”98 U.S. was underestimating the bilateral dimension of 
the struggle, which in case of Turkey and Greece, dated more than a century. The Cyprus 
conflict had unearthed the long history of enmity between Greeks and Turks. The fact 
that both Greece and Turkey were members of NATO was not enough to remove the 
historical hostilities between the two countries, especially while the two were in 
continuous struggle against each other over Cyprus. 
 The U.S. concern about preserving NATO solidarity led it to follow an 
“impartial” role in the dispute. Despite occasional slight shifts of policy in favor of one of 
the parties, it is fair to say that U.S. tried to avoid taking sides. The attempts of Greece 
and Britain to pull Washington to their side were never fully successful, though 
sometimes they partially succeeded. When, in January 1954, the British called for 
American support to British policy of keeping Cyprus under British rule, U.S. turned 
them down. Yet, U.S. also warned the Greeks against taking the issue to U.N.99  Thus, 
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U.S. was not supporting either side. The problem was between two NATO allies, and 
U.S. did not want to take sides.100 The same attitude continued when Turkey became 
involved, and even when Britain withdrew and the dispute turned into a Greek-Turkish 
struggle. Whether it was Britain, Greece, or Turkey, U.S. continuously avoided taking 
sides in fear of alienating the other, and damaging the alliance. The U.S. policy 
formulated in January 1957 was that U.S. would “favor a solution on which all parties 
[could] agree”.101 We will se that this may not always be possible. U.S., as a super 
power, was in a dilemma. It wanted the problem to be solved, but, at the same time, it did 
not want to alienate either of its two allies.  
 There were also times when the U.S. policy would shift to one side due to 
different political considerations. Though, these never amounted to taking a strong 
position against either party. When the matter was taken to the U.N. in 1954, U.S. 
position was “tilted” towards the Greeks (U.S. abstained from the vote about whether or 
not to handle the issue in the U.N.). There are a number of reasons for this position of 
U.S. One particularly interesting point is that, “the first massive Greek lobbying in the 
congress” effected the Eisenhower administration’s position, since there would be 
elections for the Congress in November that year. Greek-Americans lobbied for the “self-
determination” of the Cyprus people. The lobbying was so effective that Britain and U.S. 
agreed to delay the handling of the issue after the November elections, so that Americans 
could be more helpful to the British. When the issue was handled in U.N. after the 
elections, it was decided to postpone handling the issue, with a promise to the Greeks that 
they could appeal to U.N. in 1955 again. The Greeks were very disappointed at this.102  It 
is interesting to see how effective domestic pressure can be, especially in times of 
election. The significant point here is that, the same circumstances would be present in 
1964, when Johnson would send his famous letter. There would be this time Presidential 
elections scheduled in November 1964, and the letter would be written in June same year. 
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Thus, especially having in mind the effects of Greek lobby in 1954, it should only be 
natural that it could have affected the U.S. policy in 1964.  The domestic concerns 
affecting the Turkish-American relations would be more obvious in 2003, when the 
Turkish government’s domestic concerns would be a significant factor in the 
disagreement. 
 The U.S. was also worried about a Greek withdrawal from NATO in response to 
an unfavorable resolution of the Cyprus crisis. The U.S. would be worried that Greece 
might adopt “at least a partial disengagement from its NATO obligations” in case UK 
went ahead with the implementation of the Macmillan plan,103 therefore proposed some 
modifications to soften the Greek position “without causing the Turks to run out.”104 
Turkey also thought that the Cyprus crisis could cause a change of government in 
Cyprus, which could bring Greece to a neutralist stance, and remove Turkey’s 
geographical ties with NATO.  Therefore, when Turkey’s increasing importance in the  
eyes of the West by the end of 1950 was creating a trend towards partition on the island,  
Turkey would take initiative to reach a compromising agreement rather than a complete 
defeat for Greece.105  
 One other U.S. concern about the eventual resolution of the problem was to favor 
a long-term, viable solution. This was clearly illustrated when, in June 1956, the British 
made a new proposal suggesting the issue of self-determination to be considered by 
NATO ten years later, making it subject to the approval of both Turkey and Greece. U.S. 
did not support this so-called “June plan” because it would give Turkey and Greece the 
power to prevent any future change of the “international status” of the island.106 
Although I have not been able to find an exact quote or document proving this, my 
conclusion from my research is that U.S. did not perceive partition as a long-term viable 
solution. This was not always true throughout the Cyprus dispute. Early in June 1956, 
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Eisenhower himself had come up with the idea of partitioning the island by transferring 
the populations, moving the Turkish Cypriots to the north.107 . In March 1957, when 
Macmillan suggested to Eisenhower that “perhaps partition would be the best answer,”108 
Eisenhower responded: “if we supported partition, including most of the NATO partners, 
Greece might find it very difficult to oppose.”109 These thoughts were never 
implemented, though. U.S. position regarding partition was outlined on 18 September 
1956 as “a desperate solution of last resort, […] [which] should not be encouraged”.110 
The implementation of partition, since it would require mass moving of people, would 
create political and economic problems, as well as “bitterness and resentment” in the 
population.111 It is important to examine the U.S. position towards partition, because as 
understood by U.S., and as expressed in the Johnson letter of 1964, U.S. perceived that 
the real aim of a possible Turkish intervention would be to achieve partition. The letter, 
therefore, illustrates a strong U.S. position against partition. 
 Thus, when Cyprus became independent in 1960, U.S. very much welcomed it. 
All U.S. concerns had been met. All the parties had signed the agreements. The 
preservation of NATO unity was successfully accomplished. Also, since all parties had 
reached an agreement, U.S. had kept its impartiality without alienating either side in the 
conflict. There was no fear of Greek withdrawal from NATO anymore. The British bases 
remained under British rule, therefore guaranteeing NATO access. And, as the problem 
was solved, Soviets would not find any opportunity in the U.N. to exploit the division in 
NATO or gain influence on the island by supporting the Greek Cypriots. And, all this 
was accomplished with the initiative of the conflicting parts themselves, without the need 
for a moderator. It was almost a perfect scenario for U.S. interests. There was only one 
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weak point, though. Cyprus had become independent, and non-aligned. And, the 
communists had a sizable strength among the Greek Cypriots, which could help the 
Soviets gain influence on the island. Therefore, the main concern of U.S. after 
independence would be the prevention of the communists from gaining power in the 
island. U.S. also believed that Cyprus needed to be linked to the West as strongly as 
possible in order to prevent the Soviets from acquiring any strongholds in the 
Mediterranean.112 U.S. also had important communications facilities on the island, which 
it wanted to safeguard. 113   
 As the problem reemerged, it was only natural that old concerns and priorities 
would reemerge in the U.S. Thus, the U.S. policy in the early 1960s would be quite 
similar to the policy in the 1950s. This was because the main U.S. concern, the Cold War, 
continued to be the biggest issue affecting the U.S. interests. There were some new issues 
concerning U.S. policymakers after 1960, too. These would be the concern about a 
communist takeover of the island, and the preservation of U.S. communications facilities. 
The U.S. would therefore attempt to accomplish all of the following : 1) prevent the issue 
from causing a rift between Turkey and Greece, which might cause the disruption of 
NATO’s southern flank or Greece’s withdrawal from NATO; 2) prevent Soviets from 
gaining an influence over Cyprus either through communists or through U.N.; 3) remain 
impartial between the sides in the conflict; 4) having seen that an unviable solution would 
recreate problems rather than solving them, resolve the issue in a way that would not re-
erupt in the future again. It does not seem realistic for U.S. to set all these goals. Some of 
these goals had a very strong tendency to contradict with each other. This would also be a 
problem in 2003, when U.S. would try to satisfy both the Kurdish groups in Iraq and 
Turkey, while accomplishing its own policy goals. 
 U.S. policy toward Cyprus was outlined in a new NSC report in January 1960. 
According to this report, U.S. worried that the collapse of the Cyprus agreements would 
have serious consequences. It could harm Turkish Greek relations, create a new wave of 
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violence on the island, and have serious damage on the pro-Western government in 
Greece. Thus, it was the U.S. aim for the new independent Cyprus to become a “stable 
and unifying, rather than disruptive” element in the relations between Turkey, Greece, 
and Britain. The U.S. objectives in Cyprus were outlined as follows: 114 
A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom in a cooperative relationship, and willing and able to resist 
Communist subversion. 
The continued availability to the West of the British military facilities on 
Cyprus 
The continued, unhampered use of U.S. communications facilities on 
Cyprus115.  
Cypriot economic development conducive to the development and 
maintenance of political stability, a pro-Western orientation and free 
democratic institutions.116 
 U.S. acknowledged that the implementation of the constitution required “good 
will,” 117  i.e. a strong will among both of the two communities to make them work. Very 
soon after independence, as the problems in Cyprus began to resurface, it would be 
understood that the “trust” necessary for such a good will was absent from both sides. 
 U.S. had seriously worried about the communist threat in Cyprus, and this bias 
prevented it from seeing the real aspect of the problem in Cyprus for a long time. The 
inter-communal conflict was of secondary importance to U.S. concerns. The reemergence 
of inter-communal violence on the island, though, clearly showed that the old animosity 
between the two communities was reborn, or more realistically, it had never ceased to 
exist. Thereupon, it became impossible for U.S. to ignore the bilateral aspect of the 
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dispute. On 5 June 1962 Makarios made a visit to U.S. In this visit, Kennedy urged him 
to take measures against the communists to prevent “another Cuban situation from 
happening in Cyprus.” On 30-31 August Vice President Johnson made a visit to Cyprus, 
in which he warned Makarios of the communist threat. During this visit, Johnson also 
met with the Turkish Cypriot representatives, who gave him a memorandum about the 
problems between the two communities on the island. This visit probably helped U.S. to 
realize that the inter-communal problems on Cyprus were more severe than the threat of 
communism.118 Yet, U.S. was once again unwilling to become involved in the Cyprus 
problem. The Department of State was cautioning the Embassy in Cyprus to reject any 
effort to draw U.S. into the dispute.119 Since two NATO allies were on opposite sides, it 
was almost certain that at least one ally would be alienated. And a neutral stance would 
probably alienate both.120 
 As the constitutional crisis developed, U.S. was reluctant to take sides in the 
beginning, but with the prodding of Britain, and the U.S. ambassador in Cyprus, slowly 
changed its position to –behind-the scene- support for the amendment of the constitution. 
U.S. reached the conclusion that the long-term objective of Makarios was not enosis, but 
amending the constitution and the agreements, which “circumscribe[d] sovereignty of 
republic.”121 This was not, as the subsequent events -and the remarks of Makarios 
himself- would show, a correct analysis. U.S. was in favor of changes as long as all 
parties agreed to it.122 U.S. continued its belief that the solution should be found “in 
Cyprus by Cypriots”, and tried to discourage Makarios from taking the matter to U.N.123 
On June 6 Makarios told U.S. his conclusion that time had come to change revise the 
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Constitution and Treaty of Guarantee.124 U.S. was in favor of changes in the constitution: 
“there is no doubt that certain provisions of Constitution […] should be revised.” Yet, 
whatever course of action U.S. followed, the main objective would be to prevent Cyprus 
to continue to be “bone of contention” between Greece and Turkey.125 U.S. would 
welcome “reasonable” proposals. U.S. was aware that Britain had urged Makarios to 
follow this path, and “[U.S.] strongly supported British views.”126 The U.S. Department 
of State had decided to “fully back” the British plan, which aimed to bring Turkey to 
approve the amendment requests.127   
 Turkey had three main concerns about the Cypriot dispute: The threat posed to 
Turkey’s security in case the island fell under the control of a hostile power;  the fate and 
well-being of the Turkish Cypriots on the island, and to prevent the Cyprus dispute to 
weaken Turkey’s ties to the West by  causing a Greek withdrawal from NATO.  
 Turkey was very much aware of the Cold War, even much more involved in its 
struggle against communism than most other members of the alliance. But, this did not 
mean that Turkey did not have other security concerns than the Soviets. Turkey shared 
the U.S. concern about the fall of Cyprus into the communist bloc. Turkey and U.S. had 
the same strategic concern at this point. Neither of them would like to see a communist 
Cyprus, or even any degree of Soviet influence in the island. In fact it might be argued 
that, such an action would bring far more dangerous consequences for Turkey than for 
U.S. Yet, the difference of Turkish approach was that Turkey did not consider Greece as 
a friendly country though it was a member of NATO. Thus, enosis would mean the fall of 
Cyprus under hostile domination, which had important ramifications for Turkey’s 
security, especially of southern Turkey. Turkey was also concerned about a danger of 
communism in three of its neighbors: Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Moreover, Turkey thought 
that the Cyprus crisis could cause a change of government in Cyprus, which could bring 
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Greece to a neutralist stance, and remove Turkey’s geographical ties with NATO.128 
Thus, though the international opinion was leaning towards partition by the end of the 
1950s, Turkey had taken the initiative to resolve the issue in more favorable terms for 
Greece. 
 The Turkish Government was also under intense domestic pressure about its 
Cyprus policy. This pressure was two-fold: one was the strength of public feelings about 
the killing of Turkish Cypriots by Greeks,  the other was the pressure from the armed 
forces to take a more active policy in Cyprus, namely to intervene militarily. Both these 
aspects of domestic pressure are expressed in a number of occasions:-Ambassador Hare’s 
telegram of 14 February 1963, clearly emphasizes the domestic concerns of the 
government regarding the Cyprus dispute. Hare argues that the Turkish Parliament, as 
well as the Turkish public and the pres, was a source of great pressure on the Government 
to avoid concessions to the Greeks. This pressure, as understood from Hare’s telegram, 
was so strong as to threaten the preservation of the coalition Government.129In 
November 6, 1963, Hare again underlined the domestic pressure on the government. The 
coalition government was very weak, and this weakness was making a strong Cyprus 
policy a political “must.”130In December2 1963, Hare  reasserts that a soft policy on 
Cyprus was to be seen as “weakness,” and warns against potential  counter effects of 
external pressures on Turkey when there is a political crisis. 131  
 The Greek government, on the other hand had its own priorities. Aware of the 
pro-Turkish and pro-partition international opinion by the end of 1950s, Greece was 
content with the 1959 agreements and the 1960 constitution. Therefore Greece did not 
support the initial attempts of Greek Cypriots to change the constitution, but Greece 
changed its Cyprus policy in May 1963, and decided to support Makarios. 132 Greece 
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would favor the changing of the constitution in order to reduce the Turkish Cypriots 
status to proportional representation, which would mean that they would not be able to 
prevent enosis. Thus, first the independence of the island would be achieved, and later, 
since an “independent” country would be free to do what it chooses; Cyprus would be 
united with Greece. The only obstacle to this “union” was the Turkish Cypriots.  
E. CONCLUSION 
 Throughout the Cyprus dispute, Turkey and U.S. viewed the Cyprus problem 
from different perspectives. U.S. was a global power with global concerns and 
responsibilities. Turkey was, on the other hand, a regional partner of U.S., and an 
important ally in NATO against the common threat of communism, i.e. the Soviets. Thus 
U.S. expected Turkey to look at the Cyprus problem from the same perspective, but this 
was not possible. U.S. was always looking at the Cyprus conflict through the Cold-War 
lenses The main U.S. concerns about the Cyprus conflict were: 
9 To prevent the Cyprus issue from disrupting the southern flank of NATO 
9 To avoid a communist takeover of the island, and prevent the matter to be taken to 
U.N., because both would bring Soviet influence over the island 
9 Not to alienate either Greece or Turkey by taking any side in the conflict 
9 To achieve a long-term, stable solution to the dispute 133 
9 To safeguard NATO access to the island(by keeping the British bases under 
British control), 
9 To Safeguard the  continuous availability of the U.S. communications facilities on 
the island 
 Turkey also thought in terms of the cold war, but this did not prevent it from 
prioritizing its own national interests against its role in the global war against 
communism. The main Turkish concerns on the island were the prevention of the fall of 
Cyprus under hostile rule, and prevent the annihilation of Turkish Cypriots by Greeks. 
Thus Turkey was firmly against enosis, as well as a communist takeover of the island. 
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Turkey saw the amendment of the constitution as only a gateway to enosis, thus insisted 
on the full implementation of it.  
 It is also my conclusion that, the Cyprus policy of U.S. from the mid-1950s until 
1963 had a moderately pro-Turkish stance. In every assessment, strategic realities clearly 
favored Turkey against Greece.134 The strategic concerns about Turkey’s geographic 
location and its commitment and willingness for cooperation against the Soviets created a 
strong incentive in the U.S. to prevent the alienation of Turkey through an unfavorable 
resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Yet, U.S. also had strong concerns about Greece, too. 
Therefore, the “tilt” towards Turkey was never so strong as to take a position against 
Greece or Greek Cypriots. 
 All the parties concerned about the Cyprus dispute were affected by the domestic 
pressures as well. This was especially important for the Turkish government, which did 
not want to be seen “weak” by its public, as well as the army. 
 One other aspect we see through this era, especially prominent during the 1958 
Middle East Crisis, is that  the international circumstances also have an effect the policies 
of the parties.  
 The analysis of the developments in Cyprus until 1963 and the development of 
the foreign policies in the U.S. and Turkey shows us that both in U.S. and in Turkey the 
forming of foreign policy was influenced by three main factors: the strategic concerns 
about the issue, domestic concerns, and the international circumstances. All three of them 
have a potential to outweigh the other two concerns at different moments. For example, 
during an election period, domestic concerns may be the dominant factor in the forming 
of foreign policy. Also, an international crisis may increase one’s view about the other 
party. The strategic concerns seem to be more stable, but they may change as well.  
In the following chapter, we will analyze the further interactions between the two 
countries under changing domestic and international circumstances, compare the 
evolving policies of both countries regarding the Cyprus dispute , and  illustrate the roots 
of disagreement.  
                                                 






































III. FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS TO THE JOHNSON 
LETTER  
A. INTRODUCTION    
As it was expressed in the conclusion of the previous chapter, U.S. policy in 
Cyprus until 1963 was slightly in favor of Turkey. Yet, as we will see in this chapter, 
U.S. policy will slowly change in relation to events in 1964, and finally result in a very 
strong anti-Turkish stance in June 1964 in the form of the Johnson letter. Understanding 
the dynamic of this change requires a more detailed familiarity with the main events 
shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and U.S. in 1964. Also, the Johnson letter 
of 1964 was a reaction to the Turkish intention to intervene militarily on the island. The 
Turkish threat in turn, was a reaction the events on Cyprus. Therefore it is important to be 
aware of what happened in Cyprus between December 1963 and June 1964 that would 
cause Turkey to threaten military intervention as well as U.S. to take a strong position 
against Turkey. We need to examine what happened first, so that we can analyze why 
each side reacted differently to the same events. As we examine the key events, we will 
analyze each side’s reaction, and underline the reasons why Turkey and U.S. behaved the 
way they did in 1964. 
June 1964 is not the only time Turkey threatened to intervene militarily in Cyprus. 
After the Cyprus crisis erupted by the end of 1963, Turkey threatened to use its rights 
from the Treaty of Guarantee on three other occasions. In order to understand the 
Johnson letter and its implications more clearly, it is important to analyze the previous 
cases of Turkish threats of intervention, the U.S. responses to these occasions, and 
identify the similarities as well as differences between the June 1964 Turkish threat of 
intervention, and the U.S. response.  
Also between December 1963 and June 1964, the Cyprus dispute would be taken 
to the U.N. twice. Yet, we will see that there is a striking difference in two U.N. meetings 
in terms of the U.S. position. This will be used to argue that U.S. policy did indeed 
change, and the March 1964 U.N. meeting would mark the breaking point in U.S. Cyprus 
policy. 
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Since U.S. policy in Cyprus has been thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2, and the 
changes in this policy will be highlighted in this chapter, we still need a more through 
analysis of the Turkish broader concerns. We will examine how Turkey perceived the 
Cyprus problem in 1964, and what strategic concerns affected its policy. 
Finally, in the last section of this chapter , the evolution of U.S. Cyprus policy 
will be examined to show that U.S. slowly developed a long-term solution plan for 
Cyprus in 1964, which basically would unite the island with Greece in exchange of some 
concessions to Turkey. This section will show us, how U.S. formulated its foreign policy 
by examining each possible solution, and how it reached a decision. 
B. THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY, AND THE 
JOHNSON LETTER  
The events leading to the Johnson letter started after the 13 proposals of Makarios 
in November 1963 to amend the constitution. Therefore, in our analysis of U.S. and 
Turkish policy in Cyprus and the resulting crisis in the Turkish-American relations, we 
will concentrate on the developments on the island. 
The proposals of Makarios in November 1963 were very well timed, indeed. 
There was a government crisis in Turkey.135 Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, who had 
negotiated the London-Zurich agreements and supported the status quo after the 
independence, had lost the elections in November.136 Meanwhile a change of Presidency 
had taken place in U.S. in November 1963. After Kennedy’s assassination Lyndon 
Johnson had ascended to the Presidency.137  It may be argued that this timing of the 
proposals had an effect on the reactions of the concerned parties. U.S. would not oppose 
the proposals. It would be false, however, to consider this position totally the result of the 
inexperience of the new administration, because Johnson was also the vice-president of 
the previous administration. Johnson was quite familiar with the Cyprus dispute. He had 
even made a visit to Cyprus in 1962.  Greece had already announced its support for 
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amendment of constitution. It is very probable that the timing of the proposals was 
purposeful on the side of Greek Cypriots, who calculated  that the government crisis in 
Turkey and the resulting preoccupation of the Turkish government with domestic 
problems would prevent a severe Turkish reaction to the proposals and force Turkey into 
a more conciliatory mood. But, this would prove to be a false calculation indeed.138 This 
will also be a factor in 2003, when U.S. government would expect that an inexperienced 
government would be more flexible and less demanding, and it would turn out to be that 
a new government would be more cautious about making compromises and more worried 
about being seen “weak.” The internal politics of one country would be seen to have 
unexpected effects on the foreign policy decisions.   
İsmet İnönü’s coalition government was dissolved on 2 December. Concluding 
that delaying a response would be considered as: “evidence of weakness,” Foreign 
Minister Erkin had reached the decision to reject the proposals “definitely and publicly,” 
on 7 December.139 Raymond A Hare., U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, attributed this stern 
Turkish stance as a proof of his repeated warnings about the “danger of putting pressure 
on GOT in time of political strain.”140 Internal governmental concerns were hardening 
foreign policy positions instead of softening them.  This would also be the case in 2003 
when the newly formed government in Turkey,  which was in fact formed out of a party 
which was only one years old and practically in a “testing” period to prove itself to the 
Turkish public, would find it hard to justify making compromises to U.S. in fear of being 
seen not strong enough to protect the Turkish interests.  
Official U.S. position in the first months of 1964 was still that U.S. had enough on 
its plate to deal with, and did not want to get involved in the Cyprus dispute. It was a 
problem that needed to be dealt between the two communities, and the guarantor powers. 
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141  U.S. policy of avoiding getting involved or taking sides was continuing in the general 
framework established after the independence of Cyprus.  
With the re-eruption of violence on the island, U.S. would slowly be drawn more 
into the conflict, and would soon have to make up its mind in terms of the eventual 
resolution of the conflict. On December 21, when Greek Cypriot “special constables”142 
killed two Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia,143  this event triggered the 
reemergence of inter-communal violence on the island, which lasted practically until 
1974. As the shootings quickly spread over the island, the Turkish and Greek troops (650 
Turkish, 950 Greek), stationed on the island after the 1959 accords joined the fighting as 
well. This was a far more dangerous outcome than the inter-communal strife. For the first 
time two NATO powers were in effect fighting each other.144  This is a very important 
event that validates the U.S. concerns about a potential war between Greece and Turkey 
over Cyprus.  
The details of the inter-communal conflict are out of the purpose of this study, but 
it is this violence that prompted the Turkish threats for intervention. If we want to 
generalize the results of the 1963-1964 violence: during this era, about half of the Turkish 
Cypriots left their homes and took refuge in the areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots. 
There were 233 Turkish settlements before the violence erupted, and out of these 98 
settlements were evacuated. 4,000 Turkish Cypriots lost their jobs, and 25, 000 fled to 
live in the refuge camps.145  Not later than March 1964, the total number of displaced 
Turkish Cypriots would reach “45,000 or 50,000” while the number of displaced Greek 
Cypriots would be about 6,000.146 As the numbers clearly show, and as Nicolet rightly 
asserts, “Turkish Cypriots were the primary victims, not least because the Turkish police 
                                                 
141 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 186. 
142 These were, according to Oberling: “illegally armed Greek civilians”.  
143 Oberling, The Road To Bellapadis, 87, 88, 89. 
144 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 189. 
145 Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World, 69-70. 
146 Wilkins, “Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State,” (23 March 1964), 
FRUS, 1964-1968, XVI, 54. 
 45
and gendarmerie had been disarmed prior to the shootings […].”147  This is important, 
because it clearly shows that Turkish concerns about the safety of the Turkish Cypriots 
were indeed well founded, and not merely an excuse for an intervention. 
The reemergence of violence had a double effect of validating both Turkish 
concerns and U.S. concerns about the potential dangers inherent in the problem. The 
mass-killing of Turkish Cypriots validated Turkish concerns over a possible massacre, 
and increased the domestic pressure on the Turkish government to take a stronger action 
in response to the sufferings of the Turks on the island. While, on the other hand, the 
presence of Turkish and Greek troops on the island, and the fact that these two NATO 
forces had literally engaged in warfare against each other further increased U.S. concerns 
that a war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, which would shatter the southern 
flank of the alliance, was a very strong possibility. These different perspectives would 
continue to be the case all through the constitutional crisis, and even in the case of the 
Johnson letter. The main argument behind Turkish intention to intervene would be to 
protect the safety of Turkish Cypriots, while the main U.S. concern would be to prevent a 
war between Greece and Turkey. U.S., as a global power, and Turkey as a regional 
partner were not seeing eye to eye in the problem. They had different points of view, and 
these were affecting the way they saw the events in Cyprus.  
On the one hand, U.S. was seeing everything through the lenses of the Cold War.  
U.S. was concerned about the greater ramifications of events. It was  worried about the 
weakening of the alliance in case of a Greek-Turkish war, or a potential Russian 
intervention. In view of these possibly disastrous possibilities, the mass killing of Turkish 
Cypriots could be practically ignored in the eyes of U.S. On  the other  hand, the people 
on the island were Turkish Cypriots, namely Turks, who had migrated to the island from 
the Turkish mainland through the centuries that it was under Turkish rule. The Turkish  
public was especially very sensitive about the violence on the island. Turks were worried 
about a massacre of the Turkish Cypriots. This was putting great pressure on the 
government in Turkey. Any concession was seen as  leading to the loss of more Turkish 
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lives This did not mean that Turkey was not concerned about the greater ramifications of  
Greek-Turkish war, or a Russian intervention, but the internal concerns were so strong 
that, added with the security concerns over Cyprus falling under complete Greek rule, 
they were forcing the government to take risks.  
1. First Turkish Threat of Intervention -23 December 1964 
In response to the erupting violence on the island, Turkey called the three 
guarantor states for a joint military intervention on 23 December.148 Britain and U.S. did 
not think this was a good idea.149  Turkey was under strong domestic pressure to 
intervene militarily. In addition to the public opinion, Turkish Armed Forces was also 
pressuring the government to take a more active position. On 24 December, The Turkish 
ambassador to U.S. told to Dean Rusk -U.S. Secretary of State-  that : “real element of 
pressure was that Turkish armed forces would act with or without civilian 
government.”150 On 25 December,  asserting that Turkish Cypriot community was in the 
danger of a massacre, Turkey threatened to intervene unilaterally in case guarantor 
powers failed to control the situation.151 Yet, Turkey refrained from intervention and 
merely sent its Fighter Aricrafts to conduct a warning flight over Cyprus.152 
There are a number of reasons why Turkey did not carry out its threat and 
intervene unilaterally in December 1963 
 
1. İnönü had a very cautious personality, which made him extremely 
reluctant for such an action.153  His cautiousness had kept Turkey out of 
WWII. He believed that a military intervention in Cyprus would probably 
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lead to a war between Greece and Turkey. He was also aware that 
international opinion was not supportive of the Turkish cause at the time. 
İnönü further believed that a Turkish intervention could possibly result in 
failure as well, and considered that a diplomatic defeat would be less 
dangerous than a military one.154 
2. Soviet Union was supporting Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish intervention 
could prompt an unwanted Soviet action.155  Moscow had criticized 
Turkish flights over Cyprus as interference to “domestic 
affairs”.156Though there were British bases on the island, Cyprus was a 
non-aligned country. A Turkish intervention would probably lead to 
partition, and partition would likely lead to double-enosis157, which would 
turn the island into a NATO member. Partition would also prevent the 
Greek Cypriot communist party AKEL from establishing a communist 
regime on Cyprus.158 
3. Turkish armed forces were not ready for an amphibious operation. The 
fact that they were not equipped or trained for such an action left the air 
strikes as the only option. Turkey did not have “a single landing craft” at 
the time.159 In fact, İnönü would tell to the opposition in January that 
Turkey had “no military plans” for an invasion to Cyprus.160 
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 On 26 December, after the Turkish aircrafts had flown over Cyprus, Britain and 
Greece finally agreed for “a joint peace keeping operation,” which turned out to be 
implemented as British troops patrolling the island in order to deter violence.161 
 There are a number of aspects of this first Turkish threat of military intervention 
and the U.S. response:  First, Turkey threatened unilateral action and subsequently sent 
its aircrafts after two days of communication with the other guarantor powers,162 and 
only when Greek Cypriots refused to cease the attacks despite the joint appeal of the 
three guarantor powers. 163 This showed that Turkey was concerned about the legality of 
a military intervention and it was following the necessary procedures established in the 
treaty of guarantee in order to “take action.” This may also suggest that the intention of 
Turkish intervention was not to establish partition, but merely to reestablish the 
constitution. If that was the case all through the conflict, it means that U.S. would read 
Turkish intentions wrong by supposing that Turkey was intending to establish partition 
by a military intervention. U.S. would argue in the Johnson letter that Turkey was 
intending to establish partition by intervening militarily.  This validates the general 
opinion that Turkey has always been legalistic in terms of its international relations. 
Turkey believed that it had a legal justification for an intervention in Iraq and wanted to 
preserve this right and implement it when necessary. In 2003, this concern would come 
out in a different way again. Turkey would be emphasizing the need for  a legal 
justification to invade Iraq. 
 Second, U.S. response to this first Turkish threat of unilateral intervention is 
important to note, because it included an argument that would be repeated in the Johnson 
letter. U.S. reminded Turkey and Greece of the MAP agreements, and warned both 
countries that the use of MAP equipment for something other than its original purpose 
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without a “clear prior consent of U.S.” would be a violation of the agreements.164 Yet, 
the only mention of the purpose of military aid in the 1947 article asserted that the 
assistance was requested by Turkey for the “protection of her freedom and 
independence,” which could be interpreted differently.165 
 Third, it is also very important to note that the Turkish threat of military 
intervention finally convinced the other guarantor powers for a peace keeping operation. 
Turkey had been demanding this for a long time, but Greece and Britain had refused this 
until the Turkish threat of unilateral intervention. Thus, it might be noted in Turkey that 
the best method of diplomacy and the best way to gain concession from the other parties 
was to threaten military intervention. This may be an additional reason for the subsequent 
Turkish threats. Yet, by June 1964, it will be seen that each time Turkey threatened to 
intervene, and failed to do so, it would diminish the credibility of the next threat, and by 
June 1964, Turkey would feel the need to go through and implement its decision. In other 
words, Turkey would in a way back itself into a corner. Either it would take all the risks 
and take action to protect its security interests as well as the fate of its co-nationals, or, it 
would do nothing and watch the mass killing of Turkish Cypriots, and a gradual 
unification of the island with Greece. Thus, the June 1964 threat will be a “real” one in 
which Turkish government would in fact intend to intervene despite possible dangers in 
taking such a course.   
2. U.N. in December 1963 
 On December 27, Makarios appealed to the U.N., citing the flight of Turkish 
aircrafts, and the false claim of approaching Turkish vessels to the island as the reasons. 
U.S. tried to dissuade him from taking such an action. The main U.S. concern was, as it 
always had been, to prevent any Soviet influence in the Cyprus problem and to avoid 
providing the Soviets an opportunity for anti-Western propaganda. U.S., though it did not 
want to get involved in the issue, wanted the problem to be solved between the three 
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NATO members.166 According to George Ball, “involving the United Nations risked 
giving the communist countries leverage in that strategically placed island.” Moreover, 
U.N. would be slow to take an action, and “the Turks would not wait, tired of continued 
outrages against Turkish Cypriotes.”  He added: “then we would have a full-scale war 
between two NATO allies in the Mediterranean.” U.S. also believed Turkey considered a 
military intervention as “almost inevitable”, one which would be determined by the way 
events turned out, rather than on the initiative of Turks themselves.  Ball further 
concluded that: “an exploding Cyprus could not only endanger our Mediterranean 
position but undermine the whole southern flank of NATO.”167 Thus, U.S. policy of 
avoiding the U.N. was still in effect in December 1963. This policy would not last a very 
long time. By March 1964, U.S. would conclude that it could not prevent the issue from 
being taken to U.N. 
 After the U.N. meeting ended without reaching any agreement, U.S. had 
concluded that the reason of the Greek Cypriot appeal to the U.N. was not the “alleged” 
approach of Turkish ships, but because the “Greek Cypriots hoped to leap-frog [the] 
treaties by involving [the] U.N. in [the] Cyprus question and by invoking [the] right of 
self-determination and claiming infringement of sovereignty.”168 Thus, it was clear to 
U.S. by this time that the real intent of Greek Cypriots was to abrogate the treaties in 
order to achieve “self-determination,” which practically meant enosis. 
3. U.S. Takeover of the Cyprus Problem from Britain – February 1964  
 In mid-January 1964, Britain organized a conference in London among the 
concerned parties to discuss the Cyprus dispute. Turkey, Britain, and the Greek Cypriots 
presented their own plans, none of which was accepted.169  On 24 January 1964, as it had 
become clear that the London Conference was “going nowhere”, Britain asked U.S. about 
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whether U.S. would prefer a U.N. “peace-keeping” force, or a force “drawn from NATO 
countries,” and further mentioned that Greece had suggested the latter. U.S. Secretary of 
State did not give a “final” answer to this question, though he obviously preferred the 
second option. His main concern was about a U.S. involvement in such a force. This 
might cause a situation in which U.S. troops in Cyprus were shooting at the Turkish 
Cypriots, and this would probably put the 17,000 U.S. troops in Turkey in a dangerous 
position. He was also concerned about the “important installations” U.S. had on the 
island.170  We see two trends here: one is the continuing intention to avoid becoming 
deeply involved in the problem, and the second is the concern of protecting U.S. interests 
by safeguarding the communications facilities on the island.  
At this moment, U.S. Undersecretary of State, George Ball, voluntarily took the 
responsibility of the Cyprus problem into his hand. Thereafter, he would handle the issue 
on his own until 1965.171  Since he would be the main person responsible for the Cyprus 
policy of U.S., his views that we mention in this text are important, and most often, 
represent the official U.S. policy. 
On 25 January, asserting that they were no longer ready to deal with the problem 
alone, the British asked for U.S. agreement for the internationalization of the problem.172 
It was becoming clear that more active U.S. involvement would be necessary. But U.S. 
was still reluctant to take over from the British. It already had too much on its plate. In 
addition to the cold war and the Berlin disputes with the Soviets, U.S. was getting 
increasingly more involved in Vietnam, it was facing problems in Panama, was involved 
in Congo, and “foresaw mounting difficulties with Indonesia.”173  
In addition to strategic concerns regarding the Cyprus question, U.S. had some 
domestic concerns, as well, which affected its Cyprus policy. There were a considerable 
number of Greek Americans in U.S., and there would be an election in November in 
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1964. This concern necessitated President’s involvement in the problem. Phillips H. 
Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, was 
saying: “I would not think that in view of the political implications for ourselves in the 
election year with the number of Greek-Americans in this country […] a decision can 
hardly be made by anyone lower.”174 
At the night of 27 January President Johnson decided to send General Lyman 
Lemnitzer to Turkey and Greece to quiet down the situation.175 Lemnitzer was SACEUR 
(Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe), and he was fully aware of the danger to 
NATO. He believed that the biggest threat in the region was the growing presence of 
Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. Hence, “Greece and Turkey needed to 
cooperate and could not be allowed to fight over Cyprus.” Bosporus and Dardanelles 
were vital for the control of Mediterranean, since they were the exit points. The threat to 
the preservation of these straits was coming from the direction of Thrace. They could be 
easily approached from Bulgaria. He was also concerned that “the loss of Hellenic Thrace 
and eastern Macedonia would result in outflanking the straits from the west.” He thus 
concluded that the major strategic issue Turkey and Greece were faced with was “the 
defense of these key areas.”176  His views probably represent the way U.S. viewed the 
situation in 1964. Thus, it is clear that U.S. was still thinking in terms of the Cold War, 
and not concentrating on the bilateral aspect of the problem.  
This was  not true for all the U.S. diplomatic establishment, though. One can 
identify two main bodies of thought. Mainly, those U.S. diplomats who had deeper 
information  about the Turkish thinking on the issue seem to have a more cautious view 
about expecting Turkey to disregard its immediate national interests and focus on Cold 
War priorities. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Raymond A. Hare, would continuously warn 
the Department of State to pay more attention to the domestic concerns of the Turkish 
governments, especially during political crisis. U.S. Undersecretary of State, George Ball, 
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would also be more sympathetic to the Turkish cause, at least up until March 1964.The 
State Department officials in Washington, and the U.S. military establishment –like 
Lemnitzer- would , on the other hand, have a more Cold-War-centric view. The exception 
of Ball arises from his experience of having visited all the concerned capitals, and heard 
the arguments first hand. This would continue to be the case over and over again 
throughout the Cyprus dispute. Yet, after March 1964, even those sympathetic to the 
Turkish concerns would change their stand and agree with the others that the solution lied 
in satisfying Greek concerns and only “saving the Turkish pride.” Therefore, the 
difference  between those in the capital city  versus the local representatives would be 
overcome by the overriding policy concerns. There would also be a difference of opinion 
among the U.S. officials regarding Turkey’s role in an Iraq war in 2003. The Department 
of Defense, which would have acquired a stronger say in international relations by then, 
would be have much more optimistic expectations from Turkey regarding their 
acceptance of U.S. demands, while the Department of State officials, most significantly 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, would be more cautious and less optimistic.    
4. Second Threat of Intervention: 28 January 1964 
On 28 January, 1964, İnönü told Hare that Turkey had decided to intervene in 
Cyprus unless U.S. “gave them an answer the following morning.”177 The reason of the 
Turkish threat was a Greek Cypriot attack against the Turkish Cypriots, in which they 
massacred 215 Turks.178   The same day, Lemnitzer arrived in Turkey and later reported 
to U.S. that there was no imminent Turkish intervention, and that “Turks promised to 
consult with NATO before any unilateral move.”179  To make such a promise to U.S. 
would obviously restrict Turkey’s actions in the future, and it does not seem logical for 
Turkey to commit itself to informing NATO (i.e. U.S.) before a unilateral action, because 
it was obvious that U.S. did not favor such an action. Failing to do this would, as it 
happened in June 1964, would be an additional obstacle to gain U.S. support. In his letter 
of June 1964,  Johnson would criticize the Turkish decision to intervene as being contrary 
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to what he had been promised: that U.S. would be “fully” consulted before such a 
decision.180 Then why did İnönü choose to commit himself? In my opinion, this was 
because of Turkey’s concern not to alienate U.S. The Soviet Union was still the primary 
threat for Turkey’s security, and a military intervention in Cyprus could possibly lead to a 
Soviet reaction. The main Turkish asset for its security against the Soviet Union was 
NATO’s commitment to Turkey. Thus, Turkey wanted to protect its co-nationals in 
Cyprus, but, at the same time, it did not want to endanger its own security by making a 
move that would both provoke its principal enemy and endanger its ties with its allies at 
the same time.  
That same day, Ball stressed to Johnson that U.S. ought to avoid becoming 
mediator in the Cyprus dispute, since, he said, “anyone who settles this is going to come 
down hard on the Greeks.”181  This sentence is very important, because it shows that as 
late as 28 January 1964, U.S. was thinking that it would be the Greeks who would have to 
make more concessions in the Cyprus dispute. This is indeed surprising, because, less 
than 40 days later, after the U.N. meeting, the tide would turn completely against Turkey, 
and U.S. would be demanding much more concessions from Turkey than from Greece.  
Domestic concerns of the Turkish government were an important factor in the 
second Turkish threat of military intervention. The government was under increasing 
pressure to do something to stop the mass-killing of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek 
Cypriots, and Turkey was expecting U.S. to take a more active position in the resolution 
of the issue. On 24 January, Turkish Ambassador to U.S. told Talbot that İnönü was 
curios about why U.S. was “doing nothing” in spite of continuous “inquiries” from 
Turkey. And he asserted that İnönü needed: “something to calm potentially serious public 
reaction to new Cyprus incidents.”182 This sentence is very important for a number of 
aspects: 
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First, it shows that İnönü wants more U.S. involvement in the Cyprus dispute, and 
is frustrated with the U.S. inaction. According to Bölükbaşı, the reason for this was 
because İnönü believed that if U.S. became more involved and “forced the parties to 
negotiate”, the problem would be solved to the advantage of Turkey “easily and with 
little risk.” He further quotes an interview of İnönü on 25 January in which İnönü argues 
that he wanted U.S. to be aware of all the “facts” relating to the dispute. Because, İnönü 
said: “once U.S. understood the facts, I could not imagine it would ignore its 
responsibilities.”183   
Second, İnönü’s emphasis on public reaction shows that the government was 
under intense domestic pressure to do something about the Cyprus problem. Moreover, 
Bölükbaşı argues, “the armed forces were dissatisfied with his [İnönü’s] passivity 
regarding the Cyprus Crisis.”184 This argument confirms the Turkish ambassador’s 
comments of 24 December as expressed above. Bölükbaşı argues that U.S. involvement 
in the dispute would “make it easier for him to call for U.S. mediation and resist the 
pressures of pro-intervention circles, including the military.”185  
It is very hard to come up with a suggestion as to what U.S. could have done 
realistically. But, the truth is, a more active U.S. involvement was necessary for both the 
Greeks and Turks to justify a compromise. In the absence of that, the public opinion in 
both countries were forcing the governments to take a more rigid stance. An active U.S., 
which would develop, and promote a compromise plan that could answer the main 
concerns of each parties –though not all of them- would bring the parties closer to an 
agreement. Yet, U.S. probably thought that, though Turkey would be forthcoming in such 
a situation, the Greeks would not want to make any compromises, at all. What prevented 
U.S. from such a course of action was, in my opinion, the concerns over alienating one of 
the parties in the dispute, most specifically Greece.  
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On 29 January U.S. reversed its position about not committing U.S. troops to a 
peace force in Cyprus.  It agreed to participate in such a force. This is very important 
because no matter what the reason was, U.S. reversed its decision and took a more active 
role after Turkish threat of intervention. Bölükbaşı argues that the main reason for the 
change in U.S. policy was indeed the Turkish threat of intervention. He argues that this 
“shows the effectiveness of İnönü’s use of the leverage of invasion threats.”186 Nicolet 
does not agree with Bölükbaşı. He argues that Bölükbaşı is exaggerating  the effect of 
Turkish threats and that Johnson had already understood that a NATO force could not be 
forced without the participation of U.S., and İnönü’s threat may have only  “accelerated 
and further justified” that decision.187 One other explanation to this change of policy on 
the part of U.S. came from Philip Windsor. He argues that Turkey gathered its fleet off 
Iskenderun, and seeing this, Makarios “telegraphed to Moscow for help” the next day. 
The other day, U.S. announced that it was ready to participate in an international force in 
Cyprus. The quick change of U.S. position after the appeal of Makarios to Moscow is, 
according to Windsor, because of U.S. concern to avoid U.N. involvement in the case.188 
Whatever the case, the important thing is not exactly why U.S. changed its 
position, but how the Turkish government perceived it. And in that case, it is very 
probable that Turkey perceived the change of U.S. position as a result of the threat of 
intervention.  Thus, it is very probable that İnönü believed in his ability to influence U.S. 
policy with these threats.189  Though the reading of the events by İnönü had certain 
accuracy, the influence of the Turkish threats over U.S. policy was not as significant as 
İnönü thought it was. It was true that Turkey’s threats did influence U.S. policy, but this 
influence did not result in a policy change. The small changes in U.S. policies did not 
affect the overall policy of U.S. in Cyprus. This is important, because it brings outs the 
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importance of signaling and reading that was even more important in the 2003 crisis. In 
2003 some Turkish officials, though not all, would believe that Turkey could prevent the 
war, or U.S. could not invade Iraq without Turkish support. The huge demands of U.S. 
from Turkey, and some extraordinary diplomatic behaviors on the part of U.S. 
administration would merely serve the purpose of validating these beliefs.  
On 31 January 1964, after U.S. had agreed to participate, Britain proposed a 
10,000-strong NATO force under British command. The force, despite being made up of 
NATO forces, would not be under NATO control. One day later the Turkish and Greek 
governments accepted the plan, but Makarios refused the plan on 4 February 1964. 190 
5. Ball Mission:  February 1964 
On 8 February, Ball went on his mission to the region to discuss the problem with 
the interested parties. His main goal in the trip was to reach a solution about a peace-
keeping force that would prevent a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus.191 Before he arrived 
in Cyprus, Ball concluded that U.S. should not participate in a peacekeeping force. The 
reasons for the change of his opinion were: the growing antagonism in Cyprus to U.S., 
which would put the American troops in danger;   concerns about domestic opposition in 
U.S. during an election year; and strong refusal of the Greeks to a NATO plan.192 Yet, 
U.S. would keep this as a secret for the moment.  Ball’s intention was to “allow the 
administration to avoid the blame for failure of the NATO force,” and to put the blame on 
Makarios.193  Ball revised his plan into a U.N. force, and gained Greece’s and Turkey’s 
approval for it. 194  
After his visit to Ankara, Ball concluded that Turkey was becoming increasingly 
impatient and that “given the excited state of public opinion, any overnight killing on the 
island might force the Turkish military to intervene.” From his memoirs, it is clear that he 
had a special sympathy both for İnönü’s past deeds in the history of Turkey and for his 
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approach to the Cyprus problem. He left Ankara once again convinced that “Turkey had a 
strong responsible government,”195 while, at the same time, he was convinced that 
Turkey was not “bluffing.”196  İnönü had also made it clear to U.S. that it did not trust the 
British troops on the island for enforcing the peace, since the instructions of these troops 
were “not to shoot,” but merely give advice. This approach was certainly “not enough” 
for Turkish concerns, since it failed to stop the killing. Turkey was, at the same time, 
convinced that a Turkish intervention would prompt a British withdrawal and a Greek 
intervention “against [Turkey].”197 The accounts of Ball suggest that U.S. was aware of 
the Turkish sensitivities, and İnönü’s comments clearly illustrates that Turkey was aware 
of the inherent danger of a war with Greece in case of an intervention. 
On 12 February Ball arrived in Nicosia, His talks with Makarios failed to produce 
an agreement. Makarios was insisting on taking the matter to U.N. Security Council. His 
intent was to involve the U.N. in the dispute to the effect that the Treaties of Guarantee 
would be abolished.198 According to Ball, the main reason behind this approach was “to 
block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily 
massacring Turkish Cypriots.” He adds: “Obviously we would never permit that.” During 
Ball’s stay in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots killed about fifty Turkish Cypriots “in some 
cases bulldozers crushing their flimsy houses.” 199  Ball repeatedly asked Makarios to 
stop the bloodshed, but Makarios’ response clearly shows the weakness of the arguments 
claiming about his efforts to stop the bloodshed: “But, Mr. Secretary, the Greeks and 
Turks have lived together for two thousand years on this island and there have always 
been occasional incidents; we are quite used to this.” Ball responded by saying that the 
world would not stand by and watch this happen.  
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To gain Makarios’ acceptance, Ball revised his plan. The peacekeeping force 
would be composed of Commonwealth countries and countries like Sweden.200 Yet, 
despite Ball’s revision of the plan, Makarios insisted on rejecting the peacekeeping force. 
Ball concluded that Makarios would not ever agree to accept a peacekeeping force on the 
island, since the only thing the Greek Cypriots wanted was “to be left alone to kill 
Turkish Cypriots.” These accounts of Ball’s negotiations with Makarios are important 
because they reveal that U.S. government was aware of the situation the Turkish Cypriots 
were facing, and that, it was trying to stop them.  
Thus, Ball made a new plan that would be implemented without the need for the 
consent of Makarios.201 He came up with a plan of  a joint intervention by the three 
guarantor powers. A peacekeeping force made up of Turkey, Greece, and Britain would 
be set up on the island until the matter was resolved in the U.N. Thus the Turkish 
minority would be protected until the long discussions in the U.N. come to an end and 
effective international peacekeeping force was set up on the island. According to Ball, 
this would prevent partition as well. But the major flaw of the plan was that it would 
insert the British back into the Cyprus dispute, something the British did not want at 
all.202 Therefore this plan failed, as well. In the relations of major powers with smaller 
regional powers, the major powers often need to get other major powers – especially its 
allies- to agree with their plans. The failure of getting British approval restricted U.S. 
policies in 1964. This is a key concept that also has ramifications for 2003. In the 2003 
Iraq crisis, U.S. would ask for Turkey to practically join the war, when even the closest 
ally of U.S., Britain, had some internal disagreements regarding the war. It was not even 
certain that Britain would join U.S. in the war as strongly as it eventually did. This would 
be noted in Turkey and would cause some concerns about accepting U.S. demands.  
Ball also adopted the idea of taking the matter to the U.N. before the Cyprus 
government, and creating an international peacekeeping force on the island. Thus, taking 
the initiative in U.N. would take Makarios “off balance” and give advantage to U.S.  To 
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gain Turkey’s agreement to this plan, Ball promised İnönü that U.S. would safeguard the 
Turkish interests (including the Treaty of Guarantee) in the Security Council. Upon this 
assurance Turkey agreed to the “preemptive” appeal to the U.N. on 15 February.  İnönü 
further asserted once again that Turkey would consult U.S. before taking an action.203 
Thus Ball’s main goal in his second visit to Turkey, to “keep Turks at home” was 
accomplished.204 
In a discussion of the Cyprus problem between U.S. and Britain on 13 February, 
British Prime Minister made it clear to Johnson that in case of a Turkish intervention, 
Britain would “call on it to stop at a certain line, ” and they “certainly would not fight a 
NATO ally.”  The Greeks had told Johnson that in case of a Turkish intervention, they 
would move their army to Cyprus as well. Thus, Johnson’s main concern was to prevent 
the two armies from fighting each other. According to the British Prime Minister, 
Makarios “seemed to rely on a Soviet promise that it will keep the Turks from invading 
the island.” When the British suggested that any Soviet action of that sort would “bring 
NATO into action,” U.S. secretary of State Rusk responded that this was an extremely 
dangerous situation and “before there would be a response to a Soviet action affecting the 
Soviet-Turkish border the question would be in the Security Council.[emphasis added]” 
205  This clearly illustrates U.S. reluctance to be drawn into a war with the Soviet Union. 
The next day, with interesting coincidence, İnönü presented Ball some questions 
about similar issues to which he expected U.S.’s response. Some of these questions are 
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1.  What will U.S. response be if Russians intervene?           
2.  If U.S. advises patience, what will be advice to all other parties 
concerned in order to all other parties concerned in order to maintain even 
temporary peace and security? 
3.  Will U.S. release Turkey’s troops from NATO command to be 
available and ready? 
4.  In case nobody intervenes except Turks, may [Turkey] expect [an] 
attitude [of] benevolence and neutrality [from] U.S. Government? 
5.  [Turkey] wish[es] clear-cut indication as soon as possible [about] 
U.S.’s U.N. tactics and close cooperation… 
 
Turkey was also concerned about what Britain would do in case the troubles on 
the island went on, and whether Britain was ready to use its right of intervention together 
with Turkey.207 
U.S. responses to these questions were: that it would never give support to a 
resolution that would question the Treaty of Guarantee; and that U.S. saw no prospect of 
a Russian intervention, but assumed that “Western powers including U.S. would find [a] 
way [to] prevent [it]. U.S. also indicated that it: “noted other possibility of Soviet 
pressure on Turkey” in case of a unilateral Turkish intervention. Such an action, U.S. 
argued, would “raise greatest questions for NATO generally and underscore[d] the 
necessity of finding [an] answer [to the] Cyprus problem which would prevent that 
contingency.”208 Turkey probably got the wrong signals from this response : that U.S. 
was leaving the door open for a Turkish intervention and it would not strongly oppose a 
unilateral Turkish move; and that U.S. would support Turkey against an Unwanted 
Russian reaction.  
The above correspondence is critical in our analysis of the Johnson Letter and the 
Cyprus policies of U.S. and Turkey in 1964. As it is obvious from the first question of 
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Turkey regarding the Russian reaction to a Turkish intervention, the main concern of 
Turkey was not a war with Greece, but it was a Soviet intervention. Turkey was primarily 
concerned to safeguard U.S. support against this likelihood. The critical asset of Turkey 
against such a possibility, either to prevent it in the first case, or to respond to it properly, 
was the U.S. support against Russia. The U.S. response clearly shows that U.S. opposed a 
Turkish intervention, but by promising that the West would “find a way” to prevent it, it 
was reiterating its commitment rising from NATO membership. This may be the reason 
why Turkey felt confident to go through and implement its threat of military intervention 
in June 1964.  This issue is very significant, because the Johnson letter of June 1964 
would argue that “[Turkey’s] NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether 
they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step 
which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its 
NATO allies.” 209   
Ball was convinced that there was a “50/50” chance of Turkish intervention. He 
had also concluded that a U.N. peacekeeping force would not be able to stop the 
bloodshed. Because a U.N. force “couldn’t shoot a policeman, which was the heart of the 
matter.”  Johnson was strongly against a unilateral Turkish intervention. He believed that 
in a situation like that a U.S. threat of cutting off the aid to Turkey would be enough to 
stop the Turks.210 Meanwhile U.S. had not given up on the idea of joint military 
intervention of the guarantor powers.  But, when, on February 18, Johnson wrote a letter 
to the British Prime Minister suggesting “combined operation” as the only way to avoid 
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6. U.N. in March 1964         
As it was coordinated between Turkey, U.S., and Britain, the British took the 
matter to the U.N. before the Cyprus government did so.213 On 4 March, the Security 
Council passed a resolution calling for a U.N. peacekeeping force. The resolution did not 
safeguard the Turkish concerns at all, as Ball had promised to do. There was no mention 
to the Treaty of Guarantee in the resolution. U.S. had further promised Turkey to make a 
speech in the U.N. Security Council to “balance the general impression of a pro-Greek 
resolution,” but it did not fulfill this second promise either. The resolution was a clear 
long-term victory of Makarios, since U.N. force would not be able to stop the violence on 
the island until the 1974 Turkish intervention.214 As we have expressed before, Ball knew 
that it would be so, since a U.N. force would not shoot the Greek Cypriot “police,” who 
were themselves perpetrating violence. But the question is, if U.S. knew this, and it did 
not at least until March 1964 favor such an option, and promised to the Turks to the 
contrary, what led to the change of policy? 
To understand this, we must consider what other options were on the table. A 
NATO force option had been discarded from the beginning since it would require an 
invitation from Makarios. “A force drawn from NATO countries” had been tried, but 
Makarios had refused it. Khrushchev had declared his open opposition to the deployment 
of NATO troops to the island “under any pretext.”215  Upon this Ball had proposed a 
force from Commonwealth and neutral Western countries, but this was again refused by 
Makarios. Since the previous three options had required the acceptance of Makarios, and 
they had all failed because of his rejection, Ball had come up with the idea of joint 
intervention by the guarantor powers, which would not require the acceptance of 
Makarios. But, this time the British had rejected it. There remained three options: a joint 
intervention of Greece and Turkey; a unilateral Turkish intervention; and a U.N. 
peacekeeping force.  The U.S. was against a unilateral Turkish intervention from the 
start. It was very doubtful that Greece would accept a combined intervention since it 
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would probably lead to partition or double enosis. In addition to these, the U.S. was 
extremely reluctant to commit its troops for a peacekeeping operation. Thus, U.N. force 
option was adopted by U.S. But, still, adoption of a U.N. force could be done in a more 
balanced way by at least mentioning the Treaty of Guarantee, and this would not 
contradict the U.S. policy until that moment, because U.S. had always expressed the 
continuing validity of the treaty up until then. The U.S. clearly chose a pro-Greek policy 
in the U.N.  
Yet, being aware of the previous developments, and the U.S. efforts to bring the 
Greek Cypriots to a compromise, it would be false to argue that U.S. was indeed “pro-
Greek” all along. Rather, it seems  that, failing to force the Greek Cypriots into a 
compromise, being aware of the more “responsible” leadership in Turkey, and realizing 
that the Greeks had strong support in the U.N. from the Third World as well as the Soviet 
bloc, U.S. chose a policy that had pro-Greek implications. This signaled to Turkey that its 
major ally was adopting policies that would hurt Turkey’s national interests. According 
to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkey had “listened to [U.S.] advice re[garding] 
exerting restraint and then accepting resolution, only to find itself in a steadily 
deteriorating situation.”216 Turkish doubts regarding U.S. policies would increase as time 
passed, and Turkey would eventually conclude that it had to take the initiative and create 
a fait-accompli in order to bring a favorable chance in the status.  
One of the factors that contributed to the U.S. tilt towards Greece was the 
upcoming U.S. presidential elections. Even in mid-February, when the Greeks in Athens 
had marched protests against Johnson accusing him of being pro-Turkish, Johnson had 
clearly expressed to Ball that he did not think that this was a “good thing.” There was a 
large number of Greek American in U.S., and their vote would be important in the 
elections. Johnson even sent former President Truman to Greece for the funeral of King 
Paul in the hope of gaining some votes from the Greek Americans and “old-line 
democrats.”217 
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7. Third Threat of Intervention:  8 March 1964 
The arrival of the U.N. peacekeeping troops was delayed because of some second 
thoughts among some countries about contributing to the force. During this delay, the 
violence on the island increased further. On 8 March, Greek Cypriots launched an attack 
on the Turkish Cypriots in Baf(Paphos), Lefkosa(Nicosia), and Girne(Kyrennia).218  
Turkey saw this as an indication of the Greek Cypriot intention to create a “fait 
accompli” on the island before the arrival of the U.N. force.219  Turkey became 
increasingly concerned about the situation on the island. On 12 March İnönü convened 
the National Security Council and decided to send a memorandum to Makarios 
threatening unilateral intervention unless the attacks on the Turkish Cypriots stopped. 
Before sending the memorandum to Makarios, Turkey informed the U.S. ambassador in 
Turkey about the decision. Upon this Hare requested 24 hours delay before a decision in 
order to be able to consult with Washington. On 13 March Turkey sent the ultimatum to 
Makarios. The Turkish concern prompted U.S. to hasten the deployment of the U.N. 
force. Thus U.S. provided $2 million and free airlift to the contributing countries for the 
deployment of their forces. U.S. secretary of State Dean Rusk called the contributing 
countries to accelerate the deployment of the peacekeeping force to Cyprus. 220 Also on 
13 March, the U.N. Security Council passed another resolution which reaffirmed the 
resolution of 4 March 1964, called all the members to “refrain from action or threat of 
action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus.”221  
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The first part of the U.N. force arrived in Cyprus on 14 March 1964. According to 
the Turkish government, the rapid deployment of the U.N. force was a result of the 
Turkish threat of intervention. It was considered as “a big diplomatic success” of the 
Turkish government. As the cabinet spokesman told the National Assembly, Turkey had 
“precluded a massacre” by hastening the deployment of the peacekeeping force. The 
violence on the island indeed subsided after the arrival of U.N. force.222 The Turkish 
Government was probably right in claiming some part in the rapidization of the 
deployment process, but the argument that it was a “diplomatic success” seems to be a 
selling effort of the government who, unable to intervene unilaterally, wanted to show 
that it was delivering something to the public. 
The way Turkey conceived the situation is again important. Turkey had again 
threatened to intervene, and again had gained something in return. According to İnönü, 
Turkey had achieved its goal of stopping the attacks on Turks “without the Turkish army 
suffering a single casualty.” Moreover, İnönü had doubts about the result of a military 
intervention. He considered the possibility of ending up in a war with Greece, and “given 
the Soviet threat, he could not afford a war with Greece or alienation of U.S.”223 
C. BROADER TURKISH CONCERNS 
Turkey had two main priorities in the Cyprus dispute of 1964. It wanted to protect 
the well-being of the Turkish Cypriots on the island, and to prevent Cyprus from falling 
under the control of a hostile power. Yet, while considering actions to safeguard these 
priorities, Turkey was also keen to avoid alienating U.S. because of the need for NATO 
commitment in case of an unwanted Russian reaction. 
The preservation of the well-being of the Turkish Cypriots was mainly a domestic 
concern arising from the public sensitivity towards the killing of the Turks on the island. 
The strong feelings of the public were also shared by the Turkish Armed Forces, who 
were keener than the government to take risky actions. The government was under 
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intense domestic pressure to show that it was not “weak” and that it was able to protect 
the interests of Turkey as well as the Turkish Cypriots. 
Turkey was also concerned that Cyprus ruled by a hostile power would be a threat 
to Turkey’s security. In case of enosis, Cyprus would fall completely under Greek rule, 
and with their further decreased proportion in the new “united” Greece, Turkish Cypriots 
would not have a strong say in the government, and they would be left to the mercy of 
Greeks with whom they had been fighting for years. Second, considered together with the 
Aegean islands, a Greek Cyprus would mean Turkey’s encirclement from the sea by the 
enemy. Turkey was also concerned about a communist take over of the island, which 
would create even more dangerous consequences for Turkey. The preservation of the 
effective participation of the Turkish Community in the Cyprus government as 
established by the constitution was also acting as a safeguard against such an outcome.  
D. FROM ENOSIS TO THE JOHNSON LETTER 
1. The Evolving U.S. Position: From Slightly Pro-Turkish, to Strongly 
Pro-Greek  
As the events on Cyprus developed rapidly, U.S. diplomats had begun to engage 
in designing a long-term solution to the problem; which resulted in a more active 
diplomatic policy in March. Until January 1964, the solutions considered by the U.S. 
State department were based on the “cooperation between the two communities” in 
addition to some external help to safeguard the eventual status. Less than a month later, 
realizing the degree of animosity between Turkey and Greece, and concluding that it was 
not possible anymore for Turkey and Greece to cooperate, Gordon D. King from GTI 
(Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, Department of State) proposed to replace the tripartite Treaty of Guarantee with a 
Guarantee from Britain only. After this failed because of the British decision to 
disentangle itself from the Cyprus problem, it was proposed to insert a “NATO High 
Commissioner or Commission” as the external power.224 Meanwhile, On 7 January, John 
Bowling from GTI had argued for partition, but, it was later concluded by INR(Bureau of 
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Intelligence and Research, Department of State) that partition was “impractical”, because 
it would bring economic and social hardship, and it would not be accepted by Greece.225 
On 29 January, Dankwart A. Rustow from NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, Department of State) proposed a solution based on “exchanging the 
Turkish population with the Greek population of one or several islands off Turkey’s 
Aegean Coast.”226 According to Rustow, this proposal was recognizing the true nature of 
the conflict as one “between the Greek and Turkish Nations,” rather than one between the 
Cypriot communities.227 This argument seems to be the basis of American view, and was 
underlined by the following U.S. missions.228 It seems that, by this time, U.S. had 
diagnosed the problem correctly.  
The breaking point in U.S. policy came in March 1964. After the U.N. resolution 
on March 4, the Greeks seemed to be winning the struggle; therefore, Greece would not 
agree to the cession of an Aegean island. Hence, John Bowling argued, the exchange of 
population should be limited to Cyprus, in addition to the relocation of the Turkish 
Cypriots in Turkey. A union of Cyprus with Greece should be allowed. Turkey would be 
given two bases on Cyprus in exchange for enosis. One interesting point about this 
proposition was that, the same person who had proposed “partition” only three months 
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ago proposed it.229  One tends to think that the change in U.S. policy was a reaction of 
the changing circumstances after the U.N. resolution. But, one important issue that casts 
doubt on this thinking is, as we mentioned in the previous section, that U.S. could have 
prevented—as it had actually promised—the resolution from being as pro-Greek as it 
turned out to be, or at least, it could have balanced its effects by confirming the validity 
of the Treaty of Guarantee – again as it had promised Turkey to do. Yet, U.S. consciously 
chose not to. Therefore, my conclusion is that U.S. reached a decision to shift its policy 
away from supporting the Turkish position sometime before the U.N. meeting was 
finished.  
After the U.N. resolution, the proposals increasingly started to ask for more and 
more concessions from Turkey. On 14 March, Robert W. Komer (Member of the 
National Security Council Staff), was convinced that: “ […] Enosis might just work[…]”. 
This gives the impression that some U.S. officials were more concerned with ending the 
crisis rather than solving it. Komer argued that, those Turkish Cypriots who decided to 
stay on the island would be better protected in a united Greece than an independent 
Cyprus. Moreover, enosis would safeguard the base rights of U.S. and Britain as well. 
The “trick” was, according to Komer, “to get [the] Turks to see all this, too.”230  It is not 
certain why Komer thought that Turkish Cypriots, who had been subjected to serious 
violence despite making up one fifth of the island’s population, would be better off in a 
“united” Greece in which they would be relegated to a minority status. He was right that 
it would take a “trick” for Turkey to “see” that U.S. and British security concerns were 
being satisfied, and Turkey’s security concerns were in fact not important in the eyes of 
U.S. 
One week later, John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, argued that even territorial concession to Turkey 
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would not be necessary, because “Turkish Cypriots would be better off under NATO-ally 
Greece.” Moreover, he added, due to the increasing relations of Makarios with the Soviet 
bloc, and his emerging “signs of hostility towards British bases”, enosis would “in any 
case” be preferred to an independent Cyprus. The only need of Turkey that Jernegan 
mentioned was “to save its pride.”231 
U.S. had set out supporting the resolution of the problem by requesting the Greeks 
to compromise, but as they faced an unflinching Greek and Greek Cypriot stance that was 
also supported by the international community, and with the added concerns about the 
Greek-American votes in the upcoming elections, it ended up adopting a pro-Greek 
position.  
There are a number of reasons why U.S. felt that it could pressure Turkey more 
than it could pressure Greece. The Truman doctrine had established close ties between 
Greece and U.S., but due to the strategic importance of Turkey, and the strong 
willingness of the Turkish officials to go along with U.S. policies had increased Turkish-
American ties much more than the ties with Greece. The level of military aid to Turkey 
made the U.S. officials think Turkey would be less willing to harm its ties with U.S. than 
Greece. Also, the close and historical threat of the Soviet Union increased Turkey’s 
concerns regarding the Cold War, and constituted the primary security concern for 
Turkey. Harming its relations with U.S. would strengthen already existing doubts about 
the commitment of NATO to Turkey’s defense in case of a Soviet aggression.  
2. The Papandreou-Makarios Talks: Collaboration Against Common 
Enemy 
 Early in April 1964, Makarios visited Athens to discuss the Cyprus issue with the 
newly elected Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou. In this visit they reached an 
important agreement that greatly affected the subsequent events in Cyprus. The main 
points of their agreement were : 232 
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1.  A solution would be seeked only through NATO. Both accepting the 
competence of NATO, and bipartite talks between Greece and Turkey 
could only prejudice Greek position. 
2.  The ultimate target was enosis. 
3.  Every effort should be made not to provoke the Turks. 
4.  Greece would come to the aid of Makarios if Turkey attacked. 
It is clear that, while being a member of the same alliance, Greece would not 
hesitate to start a war with Turkey over Cyprus. These talks confirm the U.S. fear that a 
Turkish intervention would lead to a war between Greece and Turkey, yet they also show 
the equation was not only one sided : that U.S. should have also discouraged Greece from 
a war against Turkey. 
3. The U.S. Final Proposal Evolves: Enosis, In Return for Some Form of 
Compensation to Turkey 
 On 7 April, the new American ambassador to Cyprus, Taylor Belcher sent a 
telegram to the Department of State. In this telegram, Belcher proposed a solution on the 
following basis:233 
1.  Majority rule with proportional representation 
2.  Adequate safeguards for minorities 
3.  Cyprus to be tied to Greece either by enosis or in some “associated” 
status in which Greece would at minimum control foreign policy and 
defense, “perhaps” leaving other facets of government to Cypriots. 
Belcher also outlined the advantages of enosis. He argued that enosis would:234 
1.  Tie Cyprus firmly to [the] West, thus eliminating security concerns of 
UK, Turkey, and [U.S.]. 
2.  Reduce danger of further growth of Communism on [the] island 
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3.  End nuisance of Cypriot “neutralist” foreign policy maneuvering. 
4.  Remove constant irritant in Greek politics and [at the ] same time 
weaken Soviet ability [to] exploit [the] issue in Greece. 
5.  Effect set-back for Soviet(and UAR[United Arab republic]) policy in 
[the] area, which is adamantly opposed to enosis. 
6.  Give [U.S.] friendly government with which to negotiate satisfactory 
status for our communications facilities. 
What’s interesting about this proposal is that, according to Belcher, “only through 
some such device could [Turkey] be convinced that [its] security interests [were] being 
preserved and safeguarded.” He added: “ [ I ] Do not see how independent Cyprus could 
continue to be “used” in one way or another as shuttlecock in Soviet-Western Cold War 
in the area.” He further claimed that “only as part of Greece and thereby included in 
NATO security system could [Turkish] fears be mitigated.”235 This clearly shows his 
belief that Turkey and U.S. shared the same Cold War concerns with the same degree of 
importance. Belcher’s proposal and remarks clearly highlight what his basic assumptions 
about the end-state priorities of U.S. were: this was a Cold-War problem that needed to 
be dealt with in a way to produce maximum benefits to the allies against the communists, 
and all the NATO allies, including Turkey, would benefit most from such a result. The 
basic U.S. motive was to gain the upper hand against the Soviet bloc by removing the 
Cyprus problem in favor of the allies once and for all. 
There are a number of other important points about this proposal:  
First of all, his proposal was exactly the same as the Greek policy. There is 
absolutely no difference from what Makarios would suggest for a solution. 
Second, unlike what Belcher claimed, the proposal would not satisfy the interests 
of either the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey. To the contrary it would increase the risks to 
both. In case of enosis, the Turkish community would have even a lesser proportion in 
the overall population, since, and then the total population would include those of Greeks  
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in Greece as well. Thus, they would be turned into a very tiny minority and would be left 
to the complete mercy of the Greeks with whom they had been fighting for so many 
years.  
Third, “adequate safeguards”, as Belcher suggests, could have only a very tiny 
chance of being “adequate”, because, after enosis there would be no Treaty of Guarantee 
that would prevent Greek Cypriots from attacking the Turks. In case of a new inter-
communal violence, they would be able to make a very strong case of it being an 
“internal problem.”  
And, it is also important to remember that only three years after signing an 
international agreement, the Greeks (both the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greeks) 
had changed their idea and attempted to unilaterally revoke those treaties despite the fact 
that there were two other guarantor powers which would safeguard them. In case of 
enosis, in the absence of any other guarantor powers, what would prevent the Greeks 
from abrogating those “adequate” guarantees”? Any sort of an international guarantee 
would not be effective because it is hard to imagine any country which would intervene 
militarily in Greece.  
Fourth, it is also hard to imagine how Turkish fears could be “mitigated” by 
enosis. It was something Turkey had been trying to prevent since the eruption of the 
crisis. It is true that Turkey was concerned about the Soviet involvement in Cyprus. But, 
unlike what Belcher claims, enosis was not the “only” way of including Cyprus in 
NATO. An independent Cyprus could very well be included in NATO. If not 
independent Cyprus, double enosis would also result in the inclusion of Cyprus in NATO 
as well, since both Turkey and Greece were members of NATO. In short, it might be 
understandable that for some reasons the ambassador saw the enosis solution as the best 
for the U.S. interests, but his claim that it would also satisfy Turkish interests is clearly 
self-contradictory, at a minimum. 
Fifth, it is also clear that  the ambassador was probably aware of the risks for the 
Turkish community in case of enosis. His solution for that was: “assisted emigration of 
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Turks who are convinced they can no longer live with Greek Cypriots in Cyprus.”236 He 
further recommended to the Department of State to “bear in mind how sensitive is 
Cypriot pride” and argued that Greeks “can win out eventually even if this means going 
to [the U.N.].”  
Sixth, Belcher did not mention any disadvantages of enosis at all, other than that it 
would require “major selling effort with Turks.” The embassies in Athens and Ankara 
both sent telegrams the following day, in which they “reported similar conclusions: that 
either independence or enosis was the only likely solution to the Cyprus issue and that 
union with Greece would require political concessions to Turkey.”237  Even Hare had 
concluded that Turks were “losing the battle unless [Turkey] intervened militarily.”238  
Thus, by 8 April, a general consensus in U.S. was reached over the eventual solution of 
the Cyprus problem: “enosis, coupled with voluntary emigration, and some form of 
concession to Turkey.[emphasis added]” 239Also, Hare’s last comments  suggest that U.S. 
should be aware of the inevitability of a Turkish military move. The reason why U.S. 
failed to take earlier precautions to prevent such an action was probably the general 
opinion in the U.S. policy makers, including Hare, that Turkish threats were merely a 
tactic of the Turkish government to gain leverage, and that a real intervention was not 
imminent. This was because U.S. had realized that the earlier Turkish threats were indeed 
so. As Turkey threatened to intervene, and failed to do so, the threats were losing their 
influence. The effects of the earlier interactions  were preventing U.S. policy makers to 
realize the change in the Turkish mindset. This would also be the case in 2003, when U.S. 
policy makers would expect from Turkey similar, even stronger, cooperation in the Iraq 
war, due to their knowledge of Turkey’s voluntary cooperation in 1991 during the 2nd 
Gulf War as well as in many other cases like Korea, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. 
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On 10 April, Ball informed Johnson about this “unanimous position.”240 The only 
other alternative that was “feasible” and “consistent with U.S. interests” was, according 
to the U.S. ambassador in London, “partition with the union of two parts to Greece and 
Turkey respectively,” which would later be called as “double enosis.”241  If the 
ambassador was right, and double-enosis was also “consistent with U.S. interests,” which 
I think it was, then comes the question of why the U.S. always discarded that option? 
Double-enosis was not as impractical as some other proposals suggested by U.S.  
There are two main reasons for U.S. reluctance to support partition or double-
enosis: One is the fear of losing Greece from the alliance either through a communist take 
over or a withdrawal from NATO. U.S. did not have similar fears about Turkey. İnönü’s 
interview with the Time magazine, in which he argued that “[..]a new kind of world order 
will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a 
place” does not seem to have any effect on the U.S. policy. İnönü had probably made this 
statement to balance the U.S. concerns about losing a NATO ally in terms of Greece. Yet, 
it seems to me that, this speech failed to produce the desired outcome. U.S. simply did 
not think that Turkey would switch sides and side with its traditional enemy throughout 
the history. The second issue underlying U.S. stance against partition was that, as I 
previously argued, U.S. did not see partition as a long-term viable solution. A third U.S. 
concern that can be added to the above two is the domestic concern of the administration 
for the upcoming elections and the Greek-American votes. 
The Department of State finished preparing a memorandum about the possible 
solutions to the Cyprus problem on 24 April. In this memorandum, 4 main options were 
examined:242 
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Unitary state with minority guarantees 
Double enosis 
Enosis with a population exchange 
Enosis with territorial compensation 
The memorandum adopted the last option: enosis, coupled with territorial 
compensation to Turkey. Though the cession of Aegean islands was regarded 
unacceptable to Greece, the memorandum argued that  a Turkish base in Cyprus, possibly 
in the Karpas Peninsula, should be acceptable to Greece both “politically and militarily.” 
This was regarded as an adequate compensation for Turkey since a base on Karpas could 
“command the approach to sensitive Turkish military areas.” An additional compensation 
that would make the plan even more acceptable to Turkey, according to the 
memorandum, was the cession of the Kastellorizon Island to Turkey. This was probably 
considered to be acceptable to Greece because of its relatively small size of merely four 
square miles.243U.S. seems to have realized that it needed to address Turkish security 
concerns more strongly. 
4. U.S.-Greece Talks 
Just two days after Belcher’s telegram, on 10 April 1964, U.S. ambassador in 
Greece, Henry R. Labouisse, met with the Greek Prime Minster Papandreou. In this 
meeting, Labouisse urged “moderation” to Papandreou since the events were “moving in 
Greek favor.” He urged him to restrain Makarios, since “in order [to] create conditions 
conducive to ultimate settlement it [was] essential that damage to Turkish prestige be 
held to minimum.” It is also very meaningful that Labouisse “pointed out that U.S. had 
made conscious effort following Cuban crisis to spare Khrushchev as much humiliation 
as possible.” 244  It is quite clear who would be in the position of Khrushchev in this case. 
This dialogue clearly shows that U.S. was adopting a pro-Greek stance and it was not 
only Bercher who had gone pro-Greek in the U.S. diplomatic establishment.        
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During the same meeting, Papandreou told Labouisse that: “in order not [to] 
provoke Turks he would not push for enosis at this point, or even self-determination.” 
Instead of these, Papandreou “would press [for the] idea of “independence” which he felt 
was principle that no one could oppose.” It is important to note that Cyprus was already 
an independent country at the time. What Papandreou wanted was independence without 
the Treaty of Guarantee. He explained: “the new character of this independence would 
necessitate the abolishment of all recent treaties which had been proved unworkable.” 
Arguing that the Turkish Cypriots should be given the rights of a “minority,”245 under the 
protection of an “international guarantee”, Papandreou further asserted that: “Self-
determination and enosis would follow naturally since independent state could take any 
action it wished.”246      
5. The U.S. in a Dilemma 
The major dilemma U.S. faced in the eventual solution of the Cyprus problem 
was, according to Ball, in case of a proposal that would “shock” Turkey, the Turks would 
“turn to [U.S.], and ask what [U.S. was] going to do,” and, Ball argued, this would create 
a “very difficult situation.”247 The priority of the U.S. policy was still to prevent a 
unilateral Turkish intervention, since it could lead to a war with Greece. The inter-
communal violence on the island was of only “secondary” importance to U.S., as long as 
it did not cause the relations between Greece and Turkey to further deteriorate. This was 
manifested with the Fulbright mission in May 1964, when J. William Fulbright, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was sent on a “fact-finding 
mission” about the Cyprus problem to Turkey and Greece, and not Cyprus. 248 One major 
mistake of U.S. was to “treat Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus as states with long histories 
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and military and diplomatic priorities based on regional concerns that may or may not be 
compatible with the global strategy of the United States.”249  
E. U.S. DOMESTIC CONCERNS: UPCOMING ELECTIONS AND THE 
GREEK LOBBY 
Though U.S. did not support any particular side in the conflict, its support would 
carry a lot of weight for the resolution of the conflict in any particular way. Therefore the 
conflicting parties continuously tried to pull U.S. to their side. These efforts were often 
unsuccessful, though they sometimes produced results. One successful attempt to affect 
U.S. policy in Cyprus was, as we saw earlier,  the massive lobbying  in the congress by 
the Greek Americans in 1954.  
Presidential elections were to be held in U.S. in November 1964. Numerous polls 
predicted that it would be a close race. In 1964, there were about half a million Greek 
Americans in U.S., compared to a little more than a hundred thousand Turkish-
Americans. 250 Most of the Greek Cypriots lived in big cities, and were much more 
organized than the Turkish Americans. By June 26, 1964, White House had received 
2,598 letters from Greek-Americans concerning the Greeks in Turkey and Cyprus251 
while only two letters supporting the Turkish case arrived in White House, one from a 
Turkish American in Colorado, and one from İstanbul.252  
According to Nicolet: “the only realistic solution the U.S. could imagine was 
favoring Greece, and the pending presidential election made a policy that was favorable 
to the large Greek-American community a necessity.”253 Johnson had followed the 
Cyprus dispute very closely, and claiming that he was concerned about its impact on the 
Greek American voters, Stearns argues that “Rusk, a good soldier that he was, drafted the 
letter to İnönü that he had reason to believe Johnson wanted to send.”254 Moreover, it is 
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also claimed that “foreign policy for Johnson was inextricably integrated into the process 
of domestic politics.”255  This may be because of his political career a senator before he 
became President..            
In my opinion, though not solely responsible, the domestic concerns of the U.S. 
administration may have played an important role in the shift of U.S. policy in Cyprus to 
being pro-Greek, resulting in the harsh tone of the Johnson letter 
F. THE JOHNSON LETTER 
1. The Turkish Decision to Intervene 
Turkey was becoming increasingly concerned about the Cyprus problem. Things 
had started going from bad to worse. Especially after the U.N. resolution in March 
Turkey had started being increasingly isolated in its case about the eventual solution to 
the dispute. Metin Toker, the son-in-law of İnönü, summarized how The Turkish 
Government felt at the time: “we determined our policy in co-operation with the 
Americans. As a loyal ally of the United States, we informed Washington about our every 
action and intention… We seriously listened to advice of the Americans. When the 
Anglo-American plan of a NATO peace-keeping force was submitted to us, we accepted 
it though it had some points contrary to our policy. We patiently waited for attempts of 
George Ball in February 1964 although we were sure that his proposals would not be 
accepted by Makarios. Finally, we gave consent to taking the Cyprus problem to the 
United Nations after the United States promised that a good result would be achieved in 
the U.N. Although we had the right to intervene in Cyprus under the Cyprus treaties, we 
heeded warnings of Washington and did not intervene.”256  The Turks felt that U.S. 
“demanded more and more concessions from Turkey each time Makarios rejected a new 
proposal.”257   
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In April 1964, İnönü gave an interview to the Time magazine, in which he 
asserted that Turkey had dome everything it could, to “preserve its alliance with the 
West,” while its allies were “competing with the enemies of the Western camp in 
destroying the alliance.” He complained about the “hands-off” policy U.S. after the 
arrival of the U.N. force and claimed that the presence of the U.N. force made it more 
difficult for Turkey to intervene.258 He further warned that: “if our allies do not change 
their attitude, the Western alliance will break up and then a new kind of world order will 
be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place.”259 
On 17 April, İnönü criticized U.S. for not pressuring the Greeks for violating 
international agreements and the constitution, and expressed his disappointment: “ I had 
trusted in the leadership of America, who had responsibility within the Western alliance, 
I am suffering now as a result of this attitude.”260 Moreover, Turkey thought that Greece 
had exploited the moderate approach of Turkey. On April 29, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Erkin told President Johnson: “ our antagonist took advantage of our moderation and is 
seeking to inflict humiliation on us.” He further asserted that since there was the U.N. 
force on the island now, it was “not possible for [Turkey] to intervene anymore.” 261  
Meanwhile the violence on the island continued to increase, especially since the 
end of April. Both sides on the island were also taking hostages from the other side. In 
May 1964, Greek Cypriots killed 35 of the hostages.262 The U.N. force was neither 
willing nor able to intervene to stop the Greek attacks on the Turkish Cypriots.263 As the 
U.S. Ambassador in Cyprus asserted, the Greek Cypriots were increasing their resources 
and “Turkish position on the island [was] being steadily weakened.”264 
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The Greek Cypriots were militarizing rapidly. They had called up volunteer 
soldiers in February 1964, and on 8 April the Greek Cypriot cabinet legislated 
conscription. On 18 May 1964, the Greek Cypriots went so far as to announce that they 
would buy warplanes and heavy weapons.265 On 1 June 1964, they asked for the 
conscription of 25,000 people.266These developments increased Turkey’s concerns, and 
this time not only for the security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots, but to the 
“strategic security for Turkey itself.”267  
It was much more difficult for Turkey to support the Turkish Cypriots, since they 
were both less in number, and were mostly surrounded by Greek Cypriot forces in 
isolated enclaves. According to the U.S. sources, by June 1964, there were 35,000 Greek 
Cypriots troops and only 10,000 Turkish Cypriot troops on the island. The Greek Cypriot 
forces were also better equipped than Turkish Cypriots.268  
The U.S., on the other hand, was not considering the growing imbalance of power 
between the two communities on the island as the real problem. The main U.S. concern 
was the affect on NATO. So much that, it did not even want to stop Greece from shipping 
arms to Cyprus because “Makarios would certainly go ahead and obtain them from other 
non-NATO sources.”269   
On May 11 1964, Erkin asked Rusk whether U.S. would support Turkey in case 
of a Turkish intervention. Rusk replied that this was considered by U.S. as a “last resort” 
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and only the President could answer that question.270 This sentence is also a very 
important one that shows the importance of signaling. By asserting that a unilateral 
intervention was considered as a “last resort” U.S. was leaving an open door for Turkey 
to take this action. Turkey considered this as a “last resort” as well, one that would be 
necessary in case all other options failed to bring the desire result.  
The following day, İnönü told Hare that since the persuasion effort failed to 
produce any result, there remained only two alternatives for Turkey: “either submit to 
Makarios or beat some sense into his head by force.” When reminded by Hare of a 
possible Greece response to a Turkish intervention and war between Greece and Turkey, 
İnönü replied that it would up to Greece and further asserted that Turkey would be ready 
for it.271 None of these mentions of a unilateral intervention seemed to convince U.S. 
officials about the imminence of such an action. Hare would even call İnönü’s remarks as 
“reformulation of standard theme.” 272As we have mentioned before, as the number of 
Turkish threats of intervention increased, and as they continued to fail to take place, even 
though due to partial fulfillment of Turkish requests, U.S. concluded to regard them as 
merely diplomatic maneuvers to gain some leverage over the course of events. This was 
indeed so in the first threat of  intervention, and probably in the second one as well, but 
U.S. policymakers failed to recognize that this threat was indeed a real one.  
On 4 June 1964, Hare learned about a possible Turkish intervention on June 5 or 
June 6 and immediately went to see the Turkish Foreign Minister. Erkin criticized the 
U.S. for not being active on the Cyprus problem, and told him that the decision about an 
intervention would be made at 8:30 in a cabinet meeting that night. He told Hare that he 
expected U.S. support against Greece in establishing “double enosis,” or federation, and 
asserted that ideas like population exchange or cession of “some small island” to Turkey 
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were “out of question.”273 The Department of State replied to Hare by telling him to see 
İnönü immediately “calling out of cabinet meeting if necessary” and express the 
opposition of U.S. to Turkish intervention in Cyprus and “use all arguments in [his] 
arsenal to pull [Turks] back from any such decision and to insist upon consultation.”274 
The same night, Hare had a meeting with İnönü in which İnönü told Hare that Turkey 
was intending to occupy only a part of the island. Greece could do the same, and there 
could be the U.N. force between the two parts. After that, Turkey would be in a stronger 
position for the negotiations. When asked by İnönü whether U.S. would support Turkey 
or not, hare asked for 24 hours of delay to reply. 275 In his telegram to the Department of 
State, Hare asked for “strongest and most forthcoming assurances and arguments 
possible” to stop a Turkish intervention.276        
Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to achieve something “firm” from Athens to calm down 
the Turks achieved no success, and it was concluded that Greece would “react promptly 
in force” in case of a Turkish intervention.277 Belcher warned that Greek Cypriots would 
“massacre thousands of Cypriots” before Turkish forces accomplished a landing.”278 
2. Johnson’s Letter 
On 5 June 1964, President Johnson sent a letter to İnönü, “The Johnson letter,” as 
it would later called, was so shocking that George Ball would call it as “the diplomatic 
equivalent of an atom bomb,” and  Stearns would call it: “ a startling specimen of 
diplomatic overkill. ”279  When Rusk showed him a draft of the letter, Ball said: “I think 
                                                 
273 Hare, “Telegram from the Embasy in Turkey to Department of State” (4 June 1964), FRUS, 1964-
1968, XVI, 103-104. 
274 Hare, “Telegram from the Embasy in Turkey to Department of State” (4 June 1964), FRUS, 1964-
1968, XVI, 105 (footnote 2) originally from: Telegram 1285 to Ankara, June 4, 1:15 p.m. 
275 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 240 originally from: Hare, Embtel Ankara 1599 (5 
June 1964):SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA, part 1, 2  ; Hare, “Telegram from the 
Embassy in Turkey to the department of State” (5 June 1964), FRUS, 1964-1968, XVI, 106-107. 
276 Hare, “Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the department of State” (5 June 1964), FRUS, 
1964-1968, XVI, 107. 
277 Labouisse, “Telegram from the Embassy In Greece to the department of State” (4 June 1964), 
FRUS, 1964-1968, XVI, 105, 106. 
278 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 240 originally from: Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 1312 
(5 June 1964):SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA  
279 Stearns, Entangled Allies, 36  ;  Ball, Memoirs, 350. 
 84
that may stop İnönü from invading, but I don’t know how we’ll ever get him down off the 
ceiling after that.” Rusk simply responded by saying that would be Ball’s problem.280 
In this famous (or rather “notorious”) letter, Johnson argued very strongly against 
a Turkish intervention in Cyprus.281 First, Johnson criticized the Turkish decision as 
being contrary to what he had been promised: that U.S. would be “fully” consulted before 
such a decision. Second, Johnson argued that the right of taking unilateral action, as 
granted by the Treaty of Guarantee, was “not yet applicable” in this case, because 
Turkish action intended to achieve partition rather than reestablishing the constitution, 
and the treaty also required the consultation of Guarantor powers before a unilateral 
action. Third, Johnson emphasized the concerns about NATO unity and a possible Soviet 
involvement.  
Assuring İnönü that a war with Greece was certain in case of a Turkish military 
action, Johnson asserted that Turkey and Greece should follow the example of Germany 
and France in burying their hostilities. The biggest disappointment to Turkey came in the 
last part of this paragraph: “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not 
had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the 
Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full 
consent and understanding of its NATO allies.”  
Fourth, Johnson reminded İnönü of the presence of the U.N. peacekeeping force 
and the U.N. mediator on the island, and warned against a strong reaction from the U.N. 
in case of a Turkish intervention. Fifth, Johnson asserted that U.S. did not approve the 
use of “any United States supplied military equipment” in a Turkish operation, since the 
1947 Treaty between U.S. and Turkey required the U.S. approval for the use of such 
equipment “for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished.” Sixth, 
Johnson warned İnönü that, a Turkish military action would result in the “slaughter of 
tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots.”   
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To avoid giving the impression that U.S. was favoring the Greeks against the 
Turks, Johnson also asserted that U.S. policy in Cyprus had “caused the liveliest 
resentment in Athens,” and declared that U.S. would not support “any solution of Cyprus 
which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community.” Finally, Johnson warned İnönü to see 
the bigger picture as the U.S. saw it: “These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral 
relations between Turkey and United States. They not only certainly will involve war 
between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the 
unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce.” 
Johnson asked İnönü to cancel the intervention and come to U.S. to discuss the situation.  
The Johnson letter was an open “abandonment of Turkey by the United States in 
favor of Greece.”282 İnönü would state to the cabinet: “our friends and our enemies have 
joined hands against us.”283  This was an exaggeration, but it is important to show the 
perception and disappointment in Turkey regarding U.S. policies over Cyprus. The threat 
of not supporting Turkey in case of a Soviet attack against Turkey would “shake 
confidence in American commitments.”284 Turkey suddenly found out that, while Turkey 
had stood firmly against the Soviets, all of the main NATO members had increased their 
relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey had also “completely neglected” the Third 
World. Thus, both the Soviet bloc, and the Third World countries had voted against 
Turkey in the U.N. And even some of the NATO members, as well as most of the 
Muslim states, joined the Greeks in their votes against Turkey.285 The fact that even the 
Muslim states voted against Turkey in favor of non-Muslim Greeks would later, 
especially after the Johnson letter, cause Turkish Foreign Policy establishment to adopt a 
policy change regarding Middle Eastern countries.  
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Bülent Ecevit, who was the Secretary General of İnönü’s Republican People Party 
(RPP) in 1964, would argue that the letter was a manifestation of the unreliability of U.S., 
and said: 
We realized that our one-dimensional national security approach did not 
cover all contingencies. We began to discuss whether Turkey’s 
membership in NATO contributed to Turkish security or actually 
increased dangers. We also realized that [NATO’s commitment to our 
security] would be useless if our friends changed their minds [and did not 
stand up to their commitments]… We also realized how isolated we were. 
Because of the [international] isolation, we faced enormous difficulties [in 
convincing other states] that our cause was just…286    
 The Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin would say: “After this the 
relations between Turkey and the United States will never be the same.”287 
3. İnönü’s Response 
İnönü agreed to Johnson’s request and called off the operation. On 13 April, 
İnönü sent a letter to reply to Johnson’s letter.288 He started his letter by pointing out his 
disappointment to the  tone of the letter: “your message, both in wording and content, 
[had] been disappointing for an ally like Turkey.” In the remaining part, İnönü answered 
the arguments presented by Johnson against a Turkish intervention.  İnönü denied that 
Turkey was intending to establish partition, since Turkish troops would be there only 
temporarily until an agreement was reached. Pointing out that Greece was already 
declaring that the Treaty of Guarantee was dead; İnönü explained the meaninglessness of 
a consultation with Greece. 
The strongest point made by İnönü in his response was regarding the NATO unity 
and the Soviet threat. First of all, Cyprus was not a NATO country. Thus Turkey was not 
attacking a NATO country. Thus there was no need to remind Turkey that members in 
the alliance should not attack other members. Also, it was known for a fact by all the 
parties concerned with the conflict that, on numerous occasions, Turkey had proposed a 
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joint intervention with Greece. Thus, if Greece chose to wage a war against Turkey in 
case of a Turkish intervention to the island, it was in fact Greece who was starting a war 
against a NATO ally. Therefore, it was the Greeks who needed to be warned against 
attacking a NATO country, not Turkey. Turkey would mount a military operation using 
its right given by the treaties which were signed by not only Cyprus, but Greece as well. 
Thus, İnönü stated that: “[i]f […] Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be 
held responsible of [for] the consequences of such an action.”   
This is a strong argument indeed. It is  very important, because it shows the 
contradiction of U.S. policy. If the main U.S. policy goal was to prevent a war between 
Greece and Turkey, The Johnson letter should have gone to Greece instead of Turkey. 
U.S. was acting on the assumption that Turkey was aiming to establish partition. This 
also shows the mistrust between U.S. and Turkey despite the two decades of alliance. 
One other major issue both in Johnson’s letter and İnönü’s response was the issue 
of a possible Soviet involvement and U.S. reaction to this. Johnson had clearly threatened 
to stay away in case of a Russian attack on Turkey as a response to Turkey’s military 
intervention in Cyprus. This was completely the opposite of what Ball had told to İnönü 
only four months earlier. Ball had clearly stated that in case of a Soviet move against 
Turkey : “we profoundly respect our NATO obligations”.289 İnönü futher stated in his 
letter that questioning the “right or wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim 
of a Soviet aggression,[…] the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it 
would lose its meaning.” 
G. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Cypriot crisis as it reemerged after the constitutional 
amendment proposals shows us that the disagreement between U.S. and Turkey over the 
Cyprus issue did not start in June 1964 in the form of the Johnson letter. The letter was a 
result of the developments on the island, as well as the international circumstances and 
the U.S. domestic political agenda.  
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U.S. and Turkey had close cooperation throughout the crisis up until March 1964 
U.N. resolution. U.S. had become aware of the bilateral aspect of the problem as a Greek-
Turkish struggle, rather than a dispute among the Cyprus communities, and was trying to 
keep a balanced position between two of its NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.  
The two main pillars of U.S. policy were: to avoid the U.N., and to prevent 
Turkey from a unilateral intervention. U.S. was keen to avoid the issue to be exploited by 
the Russians as a means to damage the unity of NATO, or  to gain leverage among the 
Greek Cypriots.  Therefore U.S. wanted to avoid taking the matter to the U.N. Security 
Council. U.S. also feared that a unilateral Turkish move would have disastrous 
consequences. It would most certainly cause a war between Greece and Turkey, two 
NATO allies. Thus seriously damage the alliance. It could also provoke a Russian 
reaction, which could bring with it some serious consequences. Thus all U.S. attempts to 
resolve the problem intended to achieve both of the above priorities. But, as the events 
developed, U.S. saw that it would not be able to achieve both of these goals at the same 
time.  
The politics of “alliance” were more important for U.S. in 1960s than it was in 
2003. This was because of the Cold War doctrine of ‘containment,” that aimed to prevent 
the Soviets from gaining new allies. The dual-headed system of two super powers also 
restricted U.S. actions and increased the importance of smaller allies for the super 
powers. In 2003, U.S. would be the only global hegemon, thus it did not have any 
concerns about losing any allies to the other side.  
The principal aim of the Greeks was to internationalize the dispute as much as 
possible, and resolve the problem in U.N. They were confident that, if taken to the U.N., 
the dispute would be resolved in their favor once taken to the U.N. security Council. The 
Third World countries(mostly those who were  members of the “non-aligned” 
movement), and the Soviet bloc, including some members of NATO were all supporting 
Greek Cypriot demands for “self-determination.” Unlike 1958, Turkish demands for 
separate self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots were not even supported by Britain, 
who had proposed the idea in the first place. Therefore, they steadfastly refused to accept  
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any U.S. proposal that avoided the U.N., or aimed at installing a multi-national peace-
keeping force without resorting to U.N.  
Up until mid-February 1964, the main U.S. policy makers were convinced that the 
Greeks would need to make compromises to resolve the problem. Turkish concerns over 
the well-beings of the Turkish Cypriots were recognized and confirmed. During Ball’s 
trip to the area in February, U.S. tried nearly every alternative that could prevent taking 
the matter to U.N. as well as stop Turks from a unilateral action. All peacekeeping force 
alternatives required the approval of Greek Cypriots, which refused every one of them 
out of hand. Upon this U.S. suggested a joint military intervention of the three guarantor 
powers – a proposal that would satisfy Turkish concerns completely, because it would 
reemphasize Turkey’s position as a guarantor power, as well as stop the bloodshed on the 
island, while the Greek Cypriots would certainly not like it because it would install 
Turkish forces on the island-, but, because of British reluctance to get involved, failed to 
implement this proposal either.  
At the end of Ball’s trip, in mid-February, U.S. realized that it would not be able 
to prevent the Greeks from taking the issue to the U.N. Turkey, on the other hand, was 
aware of its disadvantages in case the matter was taken to U.N. all along. But, with 
specific promises from U.S. to support the Turkish case in U.N., Turkey accepted to go 
along with the U.S. plan of “preemptive” U.N. cession.  
Considering the outcome of the U.N. cession, there comes to mind two 
explanations regarding U.S. behavior: Either U.S.  had already made up its mind to shift 
its policy to a more pro-Greek position and made binding promises to Turkey on purpose, 
in order to gain Turkey’s approval for a “preemptive” U.N. cession, or U.S. indeed 
intended to keep those promises, but later changed its mind My conclusion is that it was 
the latter, because, even if U.S. had not taken the mater to U.N., the Greek Cypriots 
would take it anyway. Thus, if U.S. had planned to abandon supporting Turkish interests 
all along, it could just wait for the Greeks to apply to the U.N., without making any 
promises to Turkey.  
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When the U.N. session started in March 1964, U.S. had two choices: either it 
would continue its historical Cyprus policy of keeping a balanced position as well as 
keeping its promises to Turkey, or it would withdraw its support for the Turkish cause. 
U.S. chose the latter because it was the option that satisfied most the two priorities of 
U.S. mentioned above. U.S. had always wanted to avoid U.N. involvement in the dispute, 
but, having tried all other options that it deemed feasible, a U.N. peacekeeping force 
seemed to be the only alternative left. U.S. was aware that it would not be effective in 
stopping the bloodshed, but it would at least hopefully decrease it, and more importantly, 
the presence of U.N. troops on the island would prevent a unilateral Turkish intervention. 
Moreover, U.N. forces would not include Russian, or communist bloc troops, therefore, 
the Soviet influence could be curbed. U.S. would also be able to counter Russian 
arguments that it was avoiding the U.N. Also, as in the 1954 U.N. meeting, domestic 
considerations of the U.S. administration may have pushed it into a pro-Greek stance. 
One other important reason for the shift in U.S. policy seems to be the U.S. failure to 
force the Greeks or Greek Cypriots to a compromise. Since the Soviet bloc and the Third 
World countries supported their cause, they were confident that they would eventually 
accomplish their goals, therefore, they would not accept any proposal that harmed their 
interests. Turkey, on the other hand, relied solely on U.S. support for its arguments, and it 
had very close relations with the U.S. The Turkish leaders had much more cold war 
concerns than their Greek counterparts.  
Failing to force the Greek Cypriots into a compromise, being aware of the more 
“responsible” leadership in Turkey, and realizing that the Greeks had strong support in 
the U.N. from the Third World as well as the Soviet bloc, U.S. chose a policy that had 
pro-Greek implications. Also, the historical experience of earlier interactions with Turkey 
suggested that Turkey would be cooperative with U.S. This would be the case in 2003 as 
well, when U.S. would be trying to satisfy the Iraq Kurds’ concerns while at the same 
time trying to satisfy Turkey. The modern Turkish history of strong cooperation with 
U.S. also suggested that it would be the same in 2003.  
The U.N. meeting would be the first in a series of developments that marked a 
general “tilt” against a possible Turkish military intervention. Turkey would increasingly 
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become isolated in its claims, and would be requested to make more compromises as time 
passed. Most importantly, Turkey would begin to feel that it was being abandoned by 
U.S., for the sake of its historical enemy, Greece. Yet, the disappointment in U.S. policies 
would reach the climax only after the Johnson letter. Until then, Turkey would continue 
to demand more U.S. involvement in the Cyprus dispute. This had two reasons: One, 
Turkey still thought that U.S. considered Turkey as an “ideal ally” and taking into 
account Turkey’s role in the Cold War, it would not act against Turkish interests. The 
other reason is that: any compromise to the Greeks in the Cyprus dispute, while it would 
be to hard to defend against the sensitive public opinion, would be easier to justify if it 
was openly requested by the United States.  
The Johnson letter of June 1964 was a reaction to a Turkish threat of unilateral 
military intervention in Cyprus. Turkey had threatened to intervene on three previous 
occasions, and after all three of them, it had gained something in return. All three were in 
response to increased violence against the Turkish Cypriots on the island. The first one 
convinced the other two guarantor powers into a peacekeeping operation. The second one 
convinced U.S. to commit to a peacekeeping force, though U.S. later backed down from 
this commitment.  The third one speeded up the deployment of peacekeeping forces to 
the island. Yet, as the number of Turkish threats increased, and they failed to take place, 
both their effectiveness on the island to stop the violence as well as their diplomatic 
benefits would decrease. Yet, Turkey failed to recognize this up until June 1964, because 
all the previous Turkish threats would  have resulted in some form of political gain to the 
Turkish government, which exaggerated these gains, while the Turkish gains were merely   
figurative changes of policy implementations on  the part of the international community,  
rather than complete reversal  of policies. The first threat of military intervention had 
probably created an illusion in the Turkish government that it would continue to be 
effective.. In June 1964, as Turkey realized that its threats had begun to lose weight, it 
concluded that it would need to actually do something in order to bring a change in the 
situation . Turkey would find itself in a dilemma: either it would take military action, and 
take the risks that it would bring, or it would face a defeat against its historical adversary, 
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end up with an increased security threat to its mainland from its south, and leave the fate 
of its brethrens to the mercy of its adversaries. 
Turkey had two priorities in the Cyprus dispute: to protect the Turkish Cypriots 
and preserve their constitutional status in Cyprus, and to prevent Cyprus from falling 
under hostile domination. U.S., on the other hand, always strived to prevent an unwanted 
Turkish action that would bring Greece and Turkey into a war, and jeopardize the fate of 
the alliance. Considering the wider ramifications of a Turkish intervention, U.S. deemed 
the continuing killing of Turkish Cypriots temporarily negligible. The long-term solution 
of the problem would require the removal of the Turkish Cypriots altogether from the 
island, or their complete subjugation to the Greek government. When considered together 
with the domestic concerns of the U.S. administration over the looming elections and the 
role of Greek-American votes, and the concerns about a potential Greek withdrawal from 
NATO in case of an unwelcome solution to the Cyprus dispute, U.S. decided to stop the 
Turkish intervention with a stern letter. Yet, this “Johnson Letter” turned out to be much 
sterner than it needed to be and gave a substantial damage to the Turkish-American 
relations.  
In the following chapter, which is the conclusion chapter of the thesis, we will 
explain the roots of disagreement in 1964 in a more systematic way, and strive to 
determine the commonalities in 2003. To do this, we will first list the factors that led to 
disagreement in 1964, later recount briefly the key events of the 2003 crisis starting from 
the first requests of U.S. from Turkey up until the March 2003 vote of the Turkish 




IV. CONLUSIONS         
A. THE FACTORS LEADING TO DISAGREEMENT IN 64 
Starting with the Truman plan and continuing with Turkey’s NATO membership, 
Turkey and the U.S. formed strong relations. Though there were moments when U.S.-
Turkish relations showed signs of potential trouble, Turkey continued to be a staunch ally 
of the U.S., and the ties between the two countries continued to be strong. The underlying 
factor in this alliance was, as we mentioned in the first chapter, the “mutuality of 
interests” in greater cooperation. Yet, the 1964 Johnson letter was a very strong blow to 
these ties. For the first time, the two countries failed to agree on an issue vital to one of 
them. The analysis of the 1964 Cyprus Crisis through the developments in Cyprus, as 
well as the historical perspective of U.S.-Turkey relations, and the evolving U.S. policies 
regarding the Cyprus dispute revealed the following points as the main reasons for U.S.  
Turkey disagreement: 
1. The Dynamics in the Relations 
The U.S. was a global power with global motives, concerns, and considerations.  
Turkey was a regional partner, though an important one, with its own regional concerns 
and priorities. The dynamics in the relations between a global power and a smaller 
partner ıncluded different perspectives, motives, and expectations as well as different 
strategic concerns. 
Both countries were allies in the struggle against communism. Both Turkey and 
the U.S. considered Russia as the principal threat to their security. Thus, the basis of the 
U.S.-Turkey relations was security oriented: cooperation against a common enemy. 
Turkey fully cooperated with the U.S. against Russia, and even in other areas that it did 
not in fact deem necessary to its own interests. As long as this struggle went on, the U.S. 
and Turkey had similar perspectives. The 1964 Crisis presented Turkey with a regional 
security threat outside the scope of the traditional Cold War dynamics, and even 
contradictory to it in some aspects. Turkey was confronted with a threat from one of its 
NATO allies, Greece, and a non-aligned country, Cyprus. In addition to the security 
concerns, this situation also had strong domestic ramifications in Turkey. Moreover, the 
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struggle was one of national prestige and honor. Therefore, a defeat in this struggle would 
not only be an increased security threat in the south of Turkey, but also a blow to the 
national pride that the Turks value so high. Thus, Turkey would prioritize its regional 
security concerns over the global threats it faced. This did not mean that Turkey would 
completely ignore the global ramifications of its actions, though. To be able to deal with 
the regional threat in a way that would not jeopardize its ties with its allies, and to secure 
its global-power-ally’s support in the larger scale of threats were also high priorities. But 
Turkey could hardly ignore its concerns over Cyprus for the sake of alliance solidarity. 
That’s why Turkey continuously threatened to intervene unilaterally, while it tried not to 
alienate the U.S. with such a move. The U.S., on the other had, continuously looked at 
the issue from the Cold-War perspective, while Turkey was occupied with the bilateral 
aspect of the problem vis-à-vis Greece and the Greek Cypriots. The U.S. would treat 
Turkey and Greece “as components of a strategic equation rather than as states with long 
histories and military and diplomatic priorities based on regional concerns that may or 
may not be compatible with the global strategy of the United States.”290 
The 1964 Cyprus Crisis presented Turkey with a new and different threat to its 
security. This threat was, unlike the Soviet threat, not shared by the United States. Yet, 
Turkey was still aware of the ramifications for the Cold War. The crisis could cause a 
war between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members. This could substantially damage 
the alliance unity as well as completely disrupt the southern flank of NATO. It even had a 
potential to trigger a nuclear stalemate, due to Russian support for the Greek Cypriots and 
their unknown reaction to a Turkish intervention. The U.S., not having the same strategic 
concerns as Turkey over the Cyprus dispute, expected Turkey to prioritize its global 
struggle over its regional security concerns, while Turkey expected the U.S. to support it 
in the regional dispute.  
Another issue that created different expectations in Turkey than in the U.S. was 
the humanitarian aspect of the problem. As a champion of freedom and liberal values, the 
U.S. was expected to be sympathetic to the “sufferings” of the Turkish Cypriots in the 
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hands of the Greek Cypriots. The U.S. was indeed aware of the unpleasant aspects of the 
inter-communal violence. Yet, in the context of the strategic ramifications of the dispute 
and the potentially dangerous possibilities, this aspect of the dispute was not on the U.S. 
priority list. 
The motives of both countries were similar in principle, but different in details. 
Both wanted to protect their security, yet, the main motive of the U.S. would be to take 
the necessary steps that would fare best in the war on communism; while the main 
Turkish motive would be to safeguard its regional security while trying to secure global-
power support to prevent its regional security concerns from causing a global backlash. 
2. Unaligned Goals 
The two countries had different strategic interests in the dispute. The main U.S. 
interests were: to prevent the Cyprus issue from disrupting the southern flank of NATO, 
to prevent Soviet access to and influence over Cyprus, to avoid alienating either Greece 
or Turkey by taking sides, to achieve a long-term, stable solution to the dispute, to ensure 
NATO access to the island, and to safeguard the continuous availability of the U.S. 
communications facilities on the island. Though some of the U.S. actions do suggest that 
a long-term solution was not indeed emphasized by the U.S., rather than solving the 
problem somehow, the U.S. indeed wanted to prevent this issue from being continuously 
exploited by the Soviets.  The main Turkish interests, on the other hand, were:  to prevent 
of the fall of Cyprus under hostile rule; to stop the inter-communal violence on the island, 
which was taking Turkish Cypriot lives on a daily basis; and to solve the dispute in way 
that would not hurt national pride.  
In the eyes of the U.S. a Cyprus under Greek rule was better than an independent, 
non-aligned Cyprus. To the U.S., the former meant that Cyprus would be a NATO 
territory under the rule of a NATO ally, Greece; while the latter meant potential 
communist takeover of the island, or danger to the fate of British bases and U.S. 
communications facilities on the island. To Turkey, enosis would mean the fall of 
Cyprus, a large island in the Mediterranean only 40 miles south of Anatolia, under enemy 
rule. The historical animosity between Greeks and Turks had reemerged, and as the two 
continued to struggle over Cyprus, it was daily reemphasized.  
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3. Domestic Concerns 
Both the U.S. and Turkey were susceptible to domestic pressure regarding the 
Cyprus dispute. The Turkish public was extremely sensitive to the developments on 
Cyprus; the daily news of inter-communal violence especially most often triggered 
sensitive emotions in the public. Most analysts confirm that Turkish Cypriots were the 
primary victims in the inter-communal violence in the conflict.  The way the general 
public in Turkey conceived the situation was that their compatriots were being killed 
daily by Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish government, as well as the international 
community, was merely watching the events from a distance. This public perception, as 
well as the governmental crisis in Turkey, often resulted in a strong influence on the 
governments in Turkey to avoid being seen as “weak.” They felt the need to show the 
electorate that they were not making unnecessary compromises and were taking every 
necessary action to protect the well being of Turkish Cypriots. This increased interest of 
the public, and the domestic pressure on the government regarding a foreign policy issue 
was a new phenomenon in Turkey that had not taken place until the Cyprus Crisis 
erupted and turned into a Greek-Turkish struggle.             
A second aspect of the domestic pressure on the Turkish Government came from 
the armed forces, which were often not pleased with the conciliatory approaches of the 
government regarding the Cyprus dispute, and favored more active policies, including 
military intervention. This pressure on the government, especially considering that there 
had been a military coup in Turkey in 1960, was at least as strong as the pressure from 
the public opinion. This was clearly vindicated in various instances by the remarks of 
Turkish or American diplomats throughout the crisis.  
One other major aspect of the domestic concerns of Turkey that had foreign 
policy implications in the Cyprus dispute was the issue of “national honor.” In addition to 
being a matter of security concern as well as humanitarian feelings about the well-being 
of Turkish Cypriots, due to the historical context of Greek Turkish conflicts, the Cyprus 
dispute was a matter of national prestige for the Turkish public as a whole, both in 
Turkey and in Cyprus. The fact that the U.S. recognized this aspect of the dispute is clear 
from its references to the need for “saving Turkish pride” in the pro-Greek proposals it 
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suggested. Yet, the U.S. seems to have forgotten, or neglected, this in June 1964, when it 
wrote the Johnson letter. The U.S. “made the mistake of taking for granted that national 
prestige was secondary to concerns about the NATO cohesion” in Greece and Turkey.291  
The domestic concerns of the U.S. regarding the Cyprus dispute arose from 
its Greek-American electorate, which could play an important, though not decisive, 
role in the elections. It would be wrong to attribute the Cyprus policy of the U.S. to 
domestic concerns, but it would be equally wrong to completely ignore it.  There 
were times when the U.S. adopted pro-Turkish positions, despite the presence of 
Greek-Americans. But, during election times, U.S. policies have indeed been “tilted” 
towards Greece and the Greek Cypriots versus Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. One 
example of this is the massive lobbying in the congress by the Greek-Americans in 
1954, which resulted in the U.S. abstaining from the vote in the U.N. Security 
Council, adopting a pro-Greek stance unlike the previous practice of vetoing such 
resolutions. The change of U.S. policy after the elections clearly suggests that this 
was affected by domestic concerns. There was a similar situation in 1964. The 
presidential election that would be held in November was expected to be a close 
race.  It is concluded by a number of authors on the topic of U.S.-Turkish relations 
that the unexpectedly harsh tone and content of the Johnson letter was a result of the 
domestic concerns of the U.S. administration arising from the looming elections.292 
One critical aspect of domestic pressure on both countries was that it could have 
an unexpectedly strong effect on the foreign policy decisions of both countries at certain 
periods. When there was political crisis in Turkey or a looming election was present, this 
would prompt the government to be less compromising in foreign policy issues, 
especially over those of close concern to the general public. The U.S. officials, also, were 
affected by election concerns more when the election was looming,  particularly from the 
ethnic lobbies present in the U.S.  
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4. International Circumstances 
International circumstances also caused changes in U.S. policy and led to a 
disagreement between the U.S. and Turkey. In June1958, the U.S. was favoring a 
solution of granting Turkey some bases on the island in exchange for self-determination, 
but when the Middle East crisis broke up in July, Turkey’s position was strengthened and 
U.S. policy changed in favor of Turkey.  The U.S. then tried to convince the Greeks that 
Turkey had interests on the island that could not be ignored, and to soften the Greek 
position “without causing the Turks to run out.”293 The same year, when the issue was 
taken to the U.N., Turkey was the winning side.  
After March 1964, it was clear that the Greeks were gaining the upper hand. The 
U.S. apparently concluded that Turkey was bound to lose the struggle over Cyprus both 
militarily on the island as well as internationally.294  Belcher’s argument of April 7 that  
Greece “can win out eventually even if this means going to [the U.N.];”295 Hare’s 
comment of April 8 that Turkey was “losing the battle unless [it] intervened militarily;” 
and Komer’s statement of 6 June 1964 that the Department of State believed “…the 
Greeks [were] going to win anyway”296 all confirm this supposition. Thus, in 1964 -
unlike 1958- international opinion was against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The 
resulting U.S. policy took a pro-Greek position by supporting a form of enosis.  The U.S. 
seemed to surprisingly underestimate the negative implications of this position on 
Turkey.  Most policymakers in the U.S. even argued that this proposition would satisfy 
Turkish interests, as well. We have been unable to find any U.S. officials who mention 
the negative impact of this approach on Turkish-American relations. Moreover, though  
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some U.S. officials did mention that the only option for Turkey to reverse the tide that 
was developing against its interests in Cyprus was to take  military action, this possibility 
was not addressed at all. 
In June 1964, international opinion was overwhelmingly against a unilateral 
Turkish intervention of Cyprus. The presence of a U.N. peacekeeping force on the island, 
though it failed to “create” peace, let alone “keep” it, was making it very hard for Turkey 
to justify a military intervention with the Treaty of Guarantee. Moreover, both the Soviet 
bloc countries, as well as the Third World largely supported the Greek-Cypriot argument 
for “self-determination”. Thus, if the U.S. supported Turkish intentions, it would also risk 
being branded by the communist bloc as preventing the “self-determination” of Greek 
Cypriots. Considering the U.S. concerns over a Greek withdrawal from NATO as well as 
a communist takeover in Cyprus or increased Soviet influence on the island, such an 
action was most undesirable. Moreover, unlike Turkey, the NATO allies of Turkey did 
not see Greek rule over Cyprus as undesirable, to the contrary, it was seen as in the 
interests of the alliance. 
Also, the international repercussions of a unilateral Turkish intervention were not 
desirable at all. In case Turkey intervened militarily and the Cyprus dispute was resolved 
in a way advantageous to Turkey, this would send a “wrong” message to the international 
community that “using force might just work.” The U.S. probably wanted to avoid  
setting  a precedent that could be imitated by others. But the Greek Cypriots had already 
set the precedent in 1956. Their armed resistance had, along with the changing 
international circumstances, forced the British to withdraw from the island.  
5. Signaling Failures and Effects of Earlier Interactions 
One other important factor that caused disagreement between the U.S. and Turkey 
in the 1964 Cyprus crisis was the failure of both countries to send the right signals to the 
other side, and the erroneous interpretation of earlier interactions which thus created false 
expectations. 
Both countries sent the wrong signals to the other during the crisis. The U.S. 
response in February 1964 to Turkey’s inquiry regarding a U.S. reaction to a possible 
Turkish intervention created a false expectation on the part of Turkey that the U.S. would 
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not strongly oppose a unilateral Turkish intervention and would support Turkey against a 
Russian reaction. Also, the Turkish earlier threats of intervention caused the U.S. to 
believe that Turkey’s main goal was not to reestablish the constitutional rights of Turkish 
Cypriots, protect the rights of its co-nationals, or address its own security concerns, but to 
create facts on the ground by invading the island and later force the international 
community and the Greeks to accept partition. Thus, Turkey’s increasing number of 
threats served to alienate the U.S. rather than increase U.S. support for the Turkish cause. 
By June 1964, Turkey had threatened to intervene three times and failed to 
implement them because some of its demands were met after these threats. This created 
an impression on the Turkish officials that they could continue to gain concessions 
through threats. Yet, as the number of threats increased, their credibility started to 
decrease. The initial threats were indeed fake ones, which Turkey did not really intend to 
follow through. The U.S. would conclude that Turkey was indeed bluffing, and it  would 
be less eager to respond to Turkey’s demands as time went on. Therefore Turkey would 
gain nothing by merely threatening, and would feel the need to actually do something to 
reverse the tide. Thus, U.S. would fail to read the signals correctly that Turkey was this 
time intending to implement its threat of unilateral military intervention in June 1964.   
I have also concluded that foreign policy formation in both in the U.S. and Turkey 
is influenced by three main factors: the strategic concerns about the issue, domestic 
concerns, and the international circumstances. Each of the three have a potential to 
outweigh the other two concerns at different moments. Though the strategic concerns 
most often tend to favor Turkey in the eyes of the U.S., they are not immune to change. A 
decrease in the U.S. view about Turkey’s importance as a regional partner is likely to 
cause more policy decisions disadvantageous to Turkish interests. These will in turn 
provoke disagreement with Turkey and further damage to Turkish-American relations. 
The domestic concerns of Turkey may not be compatible with the interests of the U.S., 
and, despite the strong will of the Turkish governments to cooperate with the U.S., it is 
hard to ignore the public opinion in an increasingly democratic country like Turkey, 
where –as the November 2002 elections have shown- no party is immune to the danger of 
falling below the 10% threshold to enter the parliament. The U.S. domestic concerns have 
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a potential to affect U.S.-Turkish relations, but only on issues over which there exists a 
strong anti-Turkish lobby in the U.S. The international circumstances, on the other hand, 
may increase or decrease the need or cost of U.S. support to Turkey. Changes in the 
strategic environment will probably change the views of both the U.S. and Turkey vis-à-
vis each other.  
B. THE KEY EVENTS LEADING TO THE 2003 CRISIS  
The talks –and later negotiations- between Turkey and U.S. regarding Turkey’s 
role in an upcoming U.S. invasion in Iraq started in January 2002 and resulted in the 
refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow U.S. troops to open a second front through 
Turkish soil on 1 March 2003.  
Starting in mid-January 2002, U.S. expressed its intention to the Turkish officials 
of removing Saddam Hussein, and asked for Turkey’s cooperation. Though Turkish 
officials never pronounced a clear “no,” they always expressed their objection to a war 
and their reservations regarding the consequences of such an action. They also often 
emphasized the need for international legitimacy. 297 
The solid U.S. request for Turkey’s cooperation came on 14-17 July 2002, when 
Paul Wolfowitz and Marc Grossman made a visit to Turkey.298 Turkey’s response was 
that Turkey would act in accordance with alliance relations. Though Turkish officials 
reemphasized the potential unfavorable consequences of such an action, Wolfowitz left 
Turkey with higher hopes that an eventual cooperation was on the way.299 There was 
probably a difference between what Turks meant with “alliance relations” and what 
Wolfowitz thought it meant.  
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After this visit, Turkey adopted a two-track policy: on the one hand, it would try 
to prevent the war from happening in the first place, while on the other hand, it would try 
to make the most of –or, more realistically, reduce as much as possible the cost of- an 
inevitable U.S. invasion.300 
There was also a serious governmental crisis in Turkey. Very soon after 
Wolfowitz left, the decision for an early election on November 3 was made.  In the 
meantime, the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the General Staff determined the Turkish 
priorities regarding a war in Iraq. Turkey’s so-called “red lines”  were formulated as 
follows: 1)Formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq; 2)The fall of Mosul and Kirkuk 
under Kurdish rule; 3)Creation of a loose, decentralized government structure in Iraq, 
which could lead to the independence of Kurds or one in which Turcoman of Iraq are not 
seen as a key segment of the Iraqi population; 4)International intervention without legal 
justification; 5)Getting involved in an intervention without reaching an acceptable 
agreement with the U.S.301 The primary goal of Turkey was stated as “to prevent 
unfavorable formations in Northern Iraq”.302    
The first mention to Turkey of a “northern option” was made during Uğur Ziyal’s 
visit to U.S. on 26 August 2002. 303  Ziyal met with all the high ranking U.S. officials, 
including Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Grossman. The U.S. made seven 
demands on Turkey, including permission to use Turkish soil for a ground attack on Iraq. 
Turkey responded positively to some of the short-term requests, such as permission for 
U-2 over-flights, and permission for U.S. Special Operation Teams to pass into northern  
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Iraq through Turkey, and stated that it would consider the other requests. The acceptance 
of the short-term requests raised U.S. hopes about the eventual acceptance of the other 
demands. 304  
On 26 September, the Turkish Foreign Ministry submitted a policy document 
regarding Iraq and the U.S. demands about a “Northern Option.” The report 
recommended against granting permission to U.S. to station troops in Turkey “unless 
very dramatic changes in the circumstances took place.”305 
The exact details of U.S. demands from Turkey took shape in October. The main 
U.S. demands submitted to Turkey in October 2002 were:306 
1.  The stationing of 80.000 U.S. troops, and 250 fighter planes in Turkey. 
2. The use of six main and eight supplementary airfields, two main, three 
supplementary ports in Turkey 
3.  Permission to use Turkish lands in an operation against Iraq 
The evaluation of U.S. demands by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 15 October 
concluded that Turkey should limit its support to the Iraq operation to allowing the use of 
the İncirlik base and permitting over-flights and special operations. The document stated 
the following:307 
These requests are much more than the previously expressed levels of an 
Army Corps, four airfields, two ports, and 233 planes. This is even much 
more than U.S. demanded from Turkey in the 2nd Gulf War.[…] It will 
station on Turkish soil the greatest number of foreign forces since the 
establishment of the republic. […] The increased U.S. presence in Turkey 
might become permanent. 
In a sense, the U.S. wants a “blank check,” which will relegate Turkey to 
the status of Kuwait. […] U.S. has not indicated to Turkey the details of 
the post-Saddam Iraq it envisaged. […] Turkey’s ability to adopt its own 
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policies and its regional weight will decrease. […] It may harm the 
relations with the EU. […] It might not be decisive in preventing the 
establishment of a Kurdish State. […] It might create increased anti-
Americanism in Turkey, and prompt terrorist actions. […] It is also 
important to keep friendly relations with U.S.; therefore, Turkey should 
give active support to U.S. policies in Iraq as much as the capabilities 
permit. 
It might cause reactions, “even events” from the public, and damage the 
economy. 
It may have unfavorable regional consequences for Turkey to act, like 
Kuwait, as the base for an invasion force that would likely stay in Iraq for 
4-5 years. 
In case an invasion became inevitable, Turkey’s role was to be minimum. 
Turkey’s attention should be given to the aftermath of the operation, and 
try to be effective in the new developments.308 
The relations with U.S., depression in the economy, the Cyprus dispute, 
and possible tensions with the EU made it very difficult to reject the U.S. 
demands outright. A comprehensive demand packet was to be submitted 
to U.S., and with insistence on emphasizing the acceptance of it by the 
U.S. Congress. 309  
When General Tommy Franks, as CinCCentCom, visited Turkey on 21-23 
October,310Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit claimed that U.S. would not be able to “carry 
out this operation [against Iraq]” and advised U.S. to “abandon the idea.”311  
The Turkish elections on 3 November 2002 resulted in the victory of the AKP 
(Justice and Development Party). A new Turkish government was formed, with Abdullah 
Gül as Prime Minister. Tayyib Erdoğan, the leader of AKP, had been unable to enter 
parliament –and therefore could not become Prime Minister- due to a legal restriction he 
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faced. The newly elected and inexperienced party leaders and Ministers found themselves 
confronted with three major foreign policy issues: “Turkey’s troubled candidacy for 
membership in the European Union, a deadline in February for a Cyprus settlement, and 
the looming war in Iraq”312 
Wolfowitz and Grossman made another visit to Turkey on 3 December. They met 
with Gül and Erdoğan, who accepted U.S. requests to start reconnaissance and 
construction of new facilities in Turkish bases and airports.313 In the meantime, polls in 
Turkey showed that more than 83% of the population opposed Turkey’s involvement in 
the war in any way.314 On 10 December 2002, Erdoğan visited U.S. and met with 
President Bush. Even though he was not even a Member of Parliament, he was treated 
like a Prime Minister. This, together with the extraordinary treatment that  Ziyal had 
received previously, showed the importance U.S. gave to Turkey’s support. Yet, it was 
reported in the U.S. Press that “Bush was unable [..] to persuade [..] Erdoğan to commit 
to providing the U.S. military the access it wants.” Erdoğan had “held his ground,” 
though Bush was “angry” and “frustrated” as U.S. officials reported.315  
Though most NATO members objected the war, the U.S. had higher expectations 
from Turkey. Bush had been convinced that “as a long standing ally through NATO, 
Turkey [had] a greater obligation to provide military help […].”316In early January 2003, 
Paul Wolfowitz sent a “blunt” letter to Turkish Prime Minister  Gül, spelling out the U.S. 
                                                 
312 Karl Wick, “U.S. Suffers From Bad Timing In Request for Turkey’s Help,” The Washington Post 
(9 January 2003) 
313 Bila, Sivil Darbe Girisimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaslari, 194-195. 
314 Salmoni, “Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom(2 October 2004) originally from :  Jonathan Gorvett, “Confronting Iraq/Turkey; Under U.S. 
pressure,  Ankara weighs action in Iraq,” The Boston Globe (8December  2002) 
315 Paul Richter, “U.S. Plans for Full Turkey Access Lose Ground : A Top Official Refuses To 
Commit Extensive Military Support Amid Signs That Bush’s Bid To Speed Islamic Nation’s Entry Into EU 
Is Failing,” Los Angeles Times (12 December 2002). 
316 Paul Richter, “U.S. plans for Full Turkey Access Lose Ground : A top official refuses to commit 
extensive military support amid signs that Bush’s bid to speed Islamic nation’s entry into EU is failing,” 
Los Angeles Times (12 December 2002) 
 106
support for Turkey for over forty years. Gül responded “just as bluntly” spelling out 
Turkey’s support for U.S. in the same period.317 
On 20 January, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Myers visited Turkey, 
and met with his counterpart Özkök. In this meeting Özkök stated that U.S. demands 
needed to be decreased. The troop level should be in “thousands,” Turkish forces should 
enter northern Iraq, and “international legitimacy” should be obtained.318  Erdoğan 
complained about the unsatisfactory level of U.S. aid offers.319  
On 23 January Turkey convened a Middle East summit which called on Saddam 
to implement the U.N. resolutions “fully.”320 It bore no result, but merely gave the 
Turkish government some extra time. The Turkish National Security Council convened 
on 31 January, and recommended the government to “take the necessary steps” to 
facilitate the preparations in case of an inevitable operation, in line of the Constitution.321 
This requirement for constitutional legitimacy is significant, because according to the 
Turkish Constitution, allowing the U.S. to stage an assault on Iraq from Turkish soil 
would require international legitimacy. It would be wrong to dismiss these concerns 
simply as an excuse, because Turkey has always been legalistic in terms of international 
relations. Even in 1964, Turkish officials were very careful to follow the procedures of an 
intervention as described in the Treaty of Guarantee.  
Gül still believed there was hope to prevent the war. On 3 February, he arranged a 
meeting with Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramazan, which resulted in failure. Gül 
finally convinced himself that war was inevitable. On 6 February, Turkey permitted the 
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U.S. to upgrade the ports and airports, with a parliament bill that was opposed by 53 AKP 
deputies.322 U.S. hopes increased.323   
Meanwhile U.S.-Turkish negotiations regarding an agreement on the “Northern 
Option” and the Turkish role continued very slowly, each side proving to be tough 
negotiators. One major disagreement was over the U.S. request to place the Turkish 
troops in the operation under U.S. command, against which Turkey reacted very strongly. 
Early in February, U.S. Presidential envoy Zalmay Khalilzad stated that Turkish troops in 
Iraq would be “under the command of a U.S.-led coalition.”324  Erdoğan would dismiss 
this statement as “humiliating “and “insulting.”325 The U.S. later backed down from this 
request.   
The negotiations were progressing very slowly. Turkey told U.S. that the invoice 
would be brought to the parliament on 18 February “if an agreement is reached.”326 The 
negotiations took place on three tracks: economic, military, and political. The military 
negotiations had been mostly concluded: Turkish troops would operate with close 
coordination with U.S. troops and they would be free to engage in military conflict with 
the PKK terrorists. 327  The political aspect of the negotiations, which included the status 
of Kirkuk and Mosul, and the future of the Turcomans, had not been concluded. The U.S. 
offer on the financial aid of $4-15 billion was also seen as unsatisfactory.328  In the mean 
time, both U.S. and Turkish press mentioned a wide range of numbers regarding the 
requested and proposed level of economic aid. Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, and 
Economics Minister Ali Babacan visited U.S. to conclude the negotiations on the amount 
of economic aid U.S. would provide to compensate for Turkey’s economic losses after a 
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war against Iraq. They met U.S. Secretary of State Colın L. Powell, with whom they 
reached to an understanding on $2billion in grants, and $4 billion in credits. The next 
day, President Bush accused them of “horse-trading,” but confirmed the validity of 
“whatever Powell said.” Yet, when Yakış and Babacan returned Turkey, they found out 
that Marisa Lino, the chief U.S. negotiator, would “act as if those instructions never 
existed.” This probably created suspicions in Turkey regarding the implementations of 
the agreements. On 19 February, Erdoğan stated that Turkey would need a Congressional 
approval, since a verbal promise would not be “enough.”329  Another thing that may have 
created these doubts was the general opinion among the Turkish officials as well as the 
public that U.S. failed to keep its promises to Turkey after the 1991 Gulf war. One 
important issue creating suspicion in Turkey was the impression that the U.S. was 
favoring the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq over Turkey. Zalmay Khalilzad was acting 
like he was protecting the interests of those groups against Turkey. 330  
On 18 February 2003, since the negotiations had not been concluded, Turkey 
postponed the vote of the invoice Suspicions about U.S. motives grew even stronger on 
25 February, when Turkish military officials stated that U.S. was insisting on delivering 
anti-aircraft weapons to the Iraqi Kurds. Considering that Iraq practically lacked any air 
force capability, this action created suspicion that U.S. was trying to arm the Iraqi Kurds 
against Turkey. On 26 February, this issue became the headline in the popular daily 
newspaper Milliyet. The government was considering putting the invoice to vote on that 
same day. Though the government was “not satisfied with the agreement, but due to 
pressure, pressure from U.S., it [had] decided to forward it.”331 Yet, after this newspaper 
headline,  worried  about  a  failure  of passing the invoice, or maybe more worried about  
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having to claim the sole responsibility for it as the government since the military had 
raised objections, the AKP leaders decided to delay the invoice to after NSC meeting on 
28 February.332 
On 28 February, the NSC convened. But, unlike what AKP leaders expected, it 
did not issue a recommendation statement regarding the invoice for the Iraq war.  The 
invoice was voted on in the parliament on 1 March. The result was: 264 in favor, 250 
against, 19 abstentions. Though it had achieved majority, the vote had failed to reach the 
overall majority, which was necessary for it to pass. It failed with four votes.  
C. WHAT 1964 COULD HAVE TAUGHT ABOUT 2003 
1. The Dynamics in the Relations  
Both in 2003 and in 1964 the dynamics in U.S. Turkish relations were mainly 
same. The Cold War was over, but the threat of terrorism had replaced the threat from 
communism. Turkey and U.S. were again allies in this war. The U.S. was still the global 
power, even more so as its major adversary,the Soviet Union, had collapsed, leaving U.S. 
as the global hegemon, and Turkey was an important regional partner. In 1964 U.S. had 
expected from Turkey to prioritize global security concerns arising from the Cold War 
over those of its regional security concerns, and, as we pointed out, Turkey had not done 
so. In 2003, the global war on terror had replaced the Cold War dynamics. Turkey was 
seen by U.S. as an important ally in the global war against terror, and the Iraq war was 
declared by U.S. as a part of this global struggle for security. Turkey had cooperated 
strongly in the war against terror, especially in Afghanistan, but when it came to Iraq, 
Turkey had its own security concerns about the consequences of the war. 
In 2003 Turkey had two main concerns about a war against Iraq. First, Turkey 
was worried about the U.S. intervention in Iraq to increase the legal status of northern 
Iraq to more autonomy first, and later to independence. This increased status, coupled 
with the spoils of oil revenues in the region, could prompt this Kurdish entity to have 
undesirable influence on the Kurdish population in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey wanted 
strong assurances from U.S. that it would prevent this from happening. The repeated 
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statements of U.S. officials declaring that Iraq would be preserved as a unitary country 
and that no Kurdish state would be established failed to convince the Turkish officials, 
especially after some U.S. actions –like distributing anti-aircraft weapons to the Iraqi 
Kurds- that created suspicion. Second, the increased autonomy or chaos in the northern 
Iraq was believed to increase the power of the PKK terrorists who were hiding in 
northern Iraq. A failure of U.S. could turn the region into a safe haven for terrorists. 
Turkey wanted to use this war as an opportunity to eradicate these terrorists.  Due to 
these concerns, Turkey wanted to enter northern Iraq with its own troops and wanted a 
free hand to deal with them. These two issues were the heart of political and military 
track of the negotiations between U.S. and Turkey.  
The failure to address these concerns satisfactorily during the negotiations led to 
disagreement. The U.S. was indeed aware of Turkey’s regional concerns --mostly those 
regarding the future of Northern Iraq-- and it did accept Turkey’s demands regarding 
Turkish command of Turkish troops,  though after intense negotiations that created 
suspicion and distrust among the Turkish officials. It also accepted Turkey’s freedom to 
fight the PKK terrorists, but failed to assure Turkey of its intentions regarding the future 
of northern Iraq. This issue was more important than the economic concerns of the 
Turkish officials, and a strong agreement with the U.S. on these concerns would have 
made it a lot easier for the Turkish parliament to pass the invoice.  
Another aspect of the dynamics in the relations relevant in both 2003 and 1964 
was that Turkey regarded U.S. as the “far away” partner who “comes and goes” to the 
region, while Turkey was bound to stay there  facing the security risks from the threats 
that U.S. considered as allies. Therefore, though the Turkish concerns for global security 
concerns and relations with U.S. were very important as well, the regional security 
concerns, as well as the political ramifications in the region would be of primary 
importance to the Turkish officials. 
2. Unaligned Goals  
As in 1964, the U.S. and Turkey had different –even conflicting – goals in a war 
against Iraq. The main goal of U.S. was to topple the Saddam regime, and establish a pro-
western, preferably democratic, government. To achieve this goal it would want to use all 
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the support it could muster from the regional powers and global allies.  The future of the 
Iraqi Kurds, as long as they stayed pro-U.S., was not of primary concern to U.S. Turkey, 
on the other hand was preoccupied with the prevention of the establishment of a Kurdish 
state, or even increased autonomy to the Kurdish areas. The main threats for the U.S. 
were the Baath loyalists and the Islamic Fundamentalist terrorist groups in Iraq. Neither 
the Iraqi Kurds, nor the Kurdish terrorists, were of principal threat to the U.S. forces, 
while both of them were considered as threats by the Turkish forces.   
Thus, when U.S. tried to secure the support of the Iraqi Kurds to the operation in 
Iraq while at the same time it was negotiating with the Turkish officials for their support,  
the contradictions inevitably surfaced. U.S. was trying to gain the support of both Turkey 
and the Iraqi Kurds at the same time. Though U.S. saw both of these as allies, the two did 
not consider each other as allies. It is also important to note here that U.S. would treat 
Turkey- a very important country in a very strategic location with a history of over 5 
decades of strong elations and cooperation with U.S.- and the relatively small group of 
Iraqi Kurds with virtually same importance. This increased importance of the Kurdish 
groups arose from the fact that they were Iraqis, and that they were the only Iraqi group 
that supported a U.S. invasion. This was very similar to the situation in 1964, when U.S. 
would see both Greece and Turkey as its allies due to their membership in NATO, and 
expect the two countries to disregard their differences in favor of alliance solidarity and 
the global security concerns.  As we have underlined in the relevant sections, this failed 
to take place in 1964, as it would do the same in 2003, and U.S. would feel the need to 
choose one of its allies. This should also have been remembered by the Turkish officials, 
that U.S. could change its position from a pro-Turkish one and shift away to the support 
of other allies against Turkish interests. As U.S. shifted to a pro-Greek policy in 1964, in 
the face of failure of progress in the Turkish side, U.S. would abandon its efforts to “ally 
the mutual fears and distrust of both sides” 333 and choose to go along with the only  
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support of Iraqi Kurds in 2003. As a Turkish analyst has rightly put it : “the big problem 
is the lack of trust between the Americans and the Turks, despite the fact that we have 
been allies since 1946.” 334 
3. Domestic Concerns 
Just as in 1964, domestic concerns would also have significant influence over 
foreign policy decisions, and contribute to disagreement between U.S. and Turkey. First 
of all, U.S. should have known better before the November 3 elections that, in light of the 
overwhelming opposition from the public, the Turkish government of Ecevit would in no 
way give the support U.S. requested. The looming elections would prevent any 
government to take such an unpopular decision. U.S. did recognize this, though a little 
late, and delayed the negotiations to after the elections. The new government of AKP 
after the elections seemed to be a strong and unitary party with the power of taking 
unpopular decisions. But, the true nature of this party, as Islamically affiliated and in the 
process of proving itself to the Turkish public- as in a kind of a “testing” period- as well 
as to the state institutions, and the deep divide among the party members, would prevent 
this party to take a strong position for the war. Moreover, the sizable number of more 
fundamentalist Islamists among the party members, who were opposed to the U.S. war 
for ideological reasons, created a challenge for the party leadership, who was not very 
enthusiastic about the war itself, either.  Just as in 1964, the Turkish government would 
strive not to look “weak” to the Turkish public, as well as to its own party members. It 
had to prove that it was strong enough to protect the Turkish interests.  Thus any 
compromise over the vital Turkish interests would be seen as “evidence of weakness.” 
A second aspect of the domestic concerns of the government would, as in 1964, 
arise from the issue of national pride and honor. The cartoons in the American media 
depicting the Turks as greedy belly dancers and the like, and the reference by Bush to the 
negotiations about the economic aid packet as “horse-trading” were insults to the Turkish 
pride and honor. To the surprise of many Americans, this issue has been claimed by 
many Turks as one of the main reasons for the failure of the invoice in the parliament. 
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This may be an overexaggeration, never the less, U.S. should have known better. If 
nothing else, the experience in 1964 should have emphasized the role of emotional 
politics on Turkey.  
4. International Circumstances 
The role of international circumstances in the 2003 crisis was also a contribution 
to disagreement between U.S. and Turkey, though this time they worked against U.S. 
interests, contrary to 1964, when the overwhelming support of the international 
community to the Greek Cypriots had worked against Turkish interests. The lack of 
support for the U.S. invasion from both its NATO member allies as well as its allies in 
the region, “bolstered Ankara’s resistance ton U.S. pressure,”335 as well as it increased 
Turkey’s hopes that the invasion could somehow be prevented.  
Moreover, the lack of a second U.N. resolution that would provide the necessary 
legitimacy for a U.S. invasion would put the Turkish government in a situation to ignore 
the constitutional bindings in order to grant the U.S. demands. Even in 1964, when 
Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus, it would always try to justify the intervention 
in terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. Considered together with the background of the 
Turkish President in 2003 as the head of the Constitutional Court, this created additional 
concerns for Turkey that U.S. should have been aware of.  
5. Signaling Failures and Effects of Earlier Interactions 
The effects of signaling failures and wrong expectations due to previous 
experiences in 2003 were even greater than in 1964. Both countries sent wrong signals to 
the other side or interpreted other side’s signals wrongly in 2003. One good example is 
Turkey’s granting permission for the U.S. construction teams to renovate the Turkish 
bases. Though Turkey explicitly stated that the granting of this permission did not in any 
way mean the acceptance of permitting U.S. troops to use Turkish soil for a northern 
front, U.S. interpreted this action as a sign that the other U.S. demands would be accepted 
as well.  Turkish officials did not want to alienate U.S., therefore the U.S. demands were 
not refused outright, but major “concerns” about the possible consequences were 
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expressed continuously and U.S. was often advised to “abandon” war plans. Moreover, 
some Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Gül, for a long time believed that war 
was not inevitable, therefore continued to strive to prevent it.  All these failed to convince 
U.S. as Bülent Aliriza put early in January 2003 that “Turks really mean[t] what they say: 
They [didn’t]want this war; they [didn’t] want to participate in this war. They seem[ed] 
determined to run out the clock so that it [became] too late to get involved.” 336 
The earlier experience of cooperation between the two countries during the 2nd 
Gulf War also served as another trouble spot. The 1991 Gulf war was remembered very 
differently by Turkey and U.S. The main memory of 1991 in U.S. about the Turkish 
American relations was the strong and willing cooperation of Turkey in the war. This 
created high expectations among the U.S. officials that Turkey would again give even 
more support to U.S. in 2003.On the other hand, most Turkish officials, including the 
public, remembered the 1991 war as one in which Turkey had supported U.S. 
wholeheartedly, but ended up paying a very high cost. The 2nd Gulf war gave a strong 
blow to the weak Turkish economy and U.S. promises to compensate for Turkey’s 
economic losses in the war were not fulfilled. The refugee crisis and the increasing 
terrorist threat in Turkish borders after 1991 further strengthened the negative image of 
the Turkish cooperation in the Gulf War. Just as in 1964, earlier interactions were 
affecting Turkey and U.S. completely differently. In 1964 the three Turkish threats of 
intervention before 1964, and the resulting concessions from the international community 
–including U.S.-  had further strengthened Turkey’s belief that it could gain concessions 
through threats.  The failure of the implementation of these threats, even though they 
were due to the granted concessions, decreased their credibility in U.S. which then 
regarded the real signs of an imminent Turkish intervention as merely a bluff to gain 
more concessions.  
Another effect of earlier interactions that was present both in 1964 and 2003 was 
the overexaggeration of Turkey’s unilateral capabilities in the international context. In 
1964, some Turkish officials would over exaggerate the concessions from the 
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international community to Turkey’s threats of intervention. In 2003, the strong pressure 
from U.S. on Turkey prompted some Turkish officials –especially from the government- 
to conclude that the U.S. could not launch an attack without Turkey’s support, or that 
Turkey could somehow prevent the war. It was true that Turkey’s cooperation was 
important for U.S. And this importance was obvious from the insistent requests from 
Washington. It would most probably shorten the war, and decrease the number of U.S. 
casualties. It must also be remembered that, even U.S. officials expected a strong 
resistance in Iraq, and that the war was not expected to be won as easily as it turned out to 
be. But still, it was wrong to assume that U.S. could not wage a war over Iraq without 
Turkey’s cooperation, and as it turned out to be, U.S. would be able to risk going for it 
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